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I. INTRODUCTION
The reasonable person test, a thread that runs through the fabric of
Anglo-American law, has become so common a trope in legal discourse
that it scarcely receives much attention in its own right. It is what I
previously called a “backdrop” issue of law, a subject that is exceedingly
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common yet infrequently discussed or analyzed on its own terms.1 That
is not to say, of course, that there is no scholarly commentary on the
matter: academics have made strides in investigating what kinds of
actions, emotions, or beliefs are reasonable,2 the application of the test to
a variety of novel cases,3 the way in which the reasonable person test
negatively impacts the value of equality,4 and even, to a limited extent,
what the test would look like in a particular area of law.5 Still, the test is
frequently discussed with little thought about the reasons why it occupies a
particular field of law. As Mayo Moran notes in her seminal piece,
“[V]irtually no systematic work has been done on the reasonable person.”6
And although approaching the reasonable person test one area of law at a
time turns out to make a significant amount of sense, it is worthwhile to
step back to get a handle on what the test is and why that approach is
probably the right one. This Article analyzes one facet of the test that will
yield significant benefits in understanding the subject as a whole: how
we should determine which circumstances are part of the reasonable person
inquiry. That is, when we apply the reasonable person test and ask what
a person would do “given the circumstances,” which circumstances are
we talking about?
As a disclaimer, this Article does not seek to answer fully even this
more narrowly tailored question. The intent is to produce a framework to
analyze the issue, one that rejects the traditional framework and replaces
it with one that permits us to begin the work necessary to answer the
question. On that note, the thesis I defend is this: The circumstances that
ought to be part of the test will vary based on one’s underlying theoretical

1. Christopher Jackson, Commentary, J.D.B. v. North Carolina and the Reasonable
Person, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 9, 9 (2011), http://www.michiganlawreview.
org/assets/fi/110/Jackson.pdf.
2. See, e.g., John Gardner, The Mysterious Case of the Reasonable Person, 51 U.
TORONTO L.J. 273, 273 (2001).
3. Take for example the application of the reasonable person test to cases of
battered spouse syndrome, Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths
and Misconceptions in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379 (1991), and to
so-called “cultural defenses.”
4. The most influential, and best, work is M AYO M ORAN , R ETHINKING THE
REASONABLE PERSON (2003). But because Moran’s solution to the problems posed by
the reasonable person test is to replace it with an inquiry into whether the defendant was
culpably indifferent, I do not address her final proposal in any detail. Moreover, it is
clear that Moran’s culpable indifference thesis is meant to apply only to negligence—
criminal and civil—rather than all reasonable person tests throughout all areas of law.
See id. at 274.
5. For an example in the context of the criminal law, see Peter Westen,
Individualizing the Reasonable Person in Criminal Law, 2 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 137 (2008).
6. MORAN, supra note 4, at 2 (emphasis added). Her book, of course, being the
major exception.
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commitments. The reasonable person test is in reality a series of tests,
albeit ones that share a common core. Which test is used will vary
depending not just on the substantive law at issue but also on what
underlying theory animates that field. Here, underlying theoretical
commitments means one’s normative or justificatory view of the given
subject matter. A law and economics theorist will offer up a very different
account of the justifications of, say, criminal law than a Kantian
deontologist, and the differences between the two will generate different
versions of the reasonable person test. By unpacking some of these details
in several different fields, we will arrive at a better understanding of how
the test works in practice.
In undertaking this inquiry, I hope to push against the commonly held
belief that it is impossible to articulate a coherent view about which
circumstances are relevant in assessing the reasonableness of a defendant’s
action. Commentators have often despaired that we will never be able to
“provide a principled theory by which to distinguish those characteristics
with which the law should individualize from those with which it should
not.”7 Although we cannot distinguish relevant characteristics from
irrelevant ones by appealing to any principled a priori method, it is, or at
least may be, possible to do so by appealing to our underlying theoretical
commitments. Part of the continued frustration with this subject lies in
an erroneous assumption that there is a single, globally applicable
reasonable person test that works the same way across all different fields
of law. Although there is no list of circumstances that are always relevant
any time the reasonable person test is applied, it is possible to determine
which circumstances must be included within a specific field.
Part II sets out the relevant background, explaining what the reasonable
person test is and noting a few important distinctions that properly narrow
this Article and focus its subject matter. Part III delves into the heart of
the issue, critiquing the commonly used objective/subjective distinction
and demonstrating that there is no analytical way to distinguish relevant
circumstances from irrelevant ones. Part IV moves on to consider the
way the reasonable person test might operate in three different areas—
criminal law, tort law, and Miranda—and, paying particular attention to

7. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Scholarship: Three Illusions, 2 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 287, 320 (2001); see also MORAN, supra note 4, at 316 (arguing that the test
has become so tortured that the reasonable person “has lived out the last of his days” and
ought to be “abolish[ed]”).
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the criminal law, lays out the ways in which the underlying theory of law
will have a profound effect on the circumstances that are relevant to the
reasonable person.
II. REASONABLE PERSONS, REASONABLE DISTINCTIONS
The reasonable person “inhabit[s] every nook and cranny of the common
law”;8 he9 is a character who has found a place in tort law’s negligence,10
affirmative defenses in criminal law,11 Miranda jurisprudence,12 the
Establishment Clause,13 and even habeas proceedings,14 along with a
host of others.15 And though the reasonable person has existed at least
since the famous English tort case Vaughan v. Menlove,16 we still have
at best only a vague sketch of his biography. The test is most commonly
framed by asking what a reasonable person would do17 “under the
circumstances.”18 This “objective” standard eschews a purely subjective

8. Gardner, supra note 2, at 273.
9. I use the masculine pronoun in the historical context of the reasonable person
because, until quite recently, he was always thought to be a man. See MORAN, supra
note 4, at 199. In all other contexts, I tend toward the feminine.
10. See Mayo Moran, The Reasonable Person: A Conceptual Biography in
Comparative Perspective, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1233, 1238–49 (2010).
11. As Mandiberg notes, on just this limited topic, the reasonable person is used to
determine whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy, “whether a suspect
was actually coerced into confessing, [and] whether a police officer misstated the facts in
a search warrant.” Susan F. Mandiberg, Reasonable Officers vs. Reasonable Lay Persons in
the Supreme Court’s Miranda and Fourth Amendment Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1481, 1485 (2010) (footnote omitted).
12. See id. at 1489–92.
13. Alex Geisinger & Ivan E. Bodensteiner, An Expressive Jurisprudence of the
Establishment Clause, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 77, 124–25 (2007).
14. In this context, in order to overcome a defense of qualified immunity, the law
requires that the allegedly violated right’s “contours . . . be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Francis v.
Giacomelli, 588 F.3d 186, 196 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S.
635, 640 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
15. See, e.g., Moran, supra note 10 (discussing how the reasonable person is
involved in “many different aspects of private law, criminal law, and . . . public law”).
16. (1837) 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P.).
17. From here on out, I avoid the more awkward “believe, feel, or do,” though the
reasonable person test can apply to the defendant’s acts, emotions, and beliefs. See
Westen, supra note 5, at 138 (“[The reasonable person test] is commonly used to identify
the kinds of conduct, mental states, and emotions that wholly or partially exculpate
actors from criminal responsibility.” (footnotes omitted)). This roughly tracks Burke’s
distinction between act reasonableness and emotion reasonableness. See Alafair S.
Burke, Equality, Objectivity, and Neutrality, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1043, 1060 (2005).
18. See, e.g., State v. Simon, 646 P.2d 1119, 1120 (Kan. 1982) (“A person is
justified in the use of force . . . to the extent it appears reasonable to him under the
circumstances then existing.” (emphasis added)).
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inquiry; rather than asking what the defendant19 actually did, it sets out a
hypothetical reasonable person and asks, under the circumstances the
defendant was faced with, how she would act. It is a way of asking whether
the person’s conduct was reasonable because “[a] reasonable person is
reasonableness rendered incarnate.”20
But before we can answer this question, we must first determine which
circumstances are relevant to the reasonable person test—which facts
about the situation we must saddle the reasonable person with before asking
what she would do. The physical features of the situation will likely be
included, while the particular peccadilloes of the defendant probably will
not, and so on. And although these factors are uncomplicated, a host of
others are not so easily sorted. As we shall see in Part IV.A, there is no
analytical way to separate relevant circumstances from irrelevant ones: we
do not have “a clear sense of which qualities of the reasonable person
matter.”21
Before delving into the details, staking out two distinctions will help
sharpen our focus. First, there are—at least—two separate questions the
reasonable person test poses. In applying the test to a given fact pattern,
we might ask how a reasonable person reasons—how she goes about
reaching her beliefs or deciding to take some action. This might be
rephrased by asking for an account of the term reasonableness, which is,
after all, a “measure of ways in which it is right for persons to think, feel
or behave.”22 This first question has been explored elsewhere in some
detail,23 with some disagreement about whether the reasonable person
test is meant to instantiate a purely positive notion—asking, roughly, what
an average person would do, so that right here means “ordinary”—or a
normative one.24 On this first question, a number of commentators have
19. The reasonable person test can of course be applied to any party in a given
matter. I use the word defendant, rather than the more awkward relevant party or
defendant or plaintiff for ease of reading.
20. Westen, supra note 5, at 139.
21. MORAN, supra note 4, at 3; see also Robinson, supra note 7, at 306 (discussing
“[w]hich characteristics of a defendant should be attributed to the reasonable person in
judging the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct and which characteristics should
not”).
22. Westen, supra note 5, at 138.
23. E.g., Gardner, supra note 2.
24. Compare Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of Reasonable Racists,
Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 788 (1994)
(arguing that there is a normative aspect to the reasonable person test), and Westen,
supra note 5, at 138 (referring to the reasonable person test as “a normative measure”),
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fallen in line behind the view that a reasonable person is one “whose
actions display appropriate regard for both her interests and the interests
of others.”25 But we might also ask what factors should be relevant in
making that determination—what context we should give the reasonable
person before asking about how she reasons. This Article focuses on the
second question, rather than the first.26 Now, one might think that the
latter question incorporates the former27: if we incorporated all of the
characteristics of the defendant into the reasonable person test, we
presumably would incorporate all those features of the defendant that
lead her to reason the way she reasons.28 But we can coherently distinguish
between an account of reasonableness and the reasonable person’s
circumstances: although the defendant’s circumstances can effect what
conclusions a reasonable person would draw—this is necessarily so, for
if they had no such effect, there would be no dispute about whether to
include them—that does not answer the question of what the reasonable
conclusions are, given a particular set of relevant circumstances. In
other words, precisely because we incorporate only some, but not all, of
the circumstances of the defendant into the reasonable person test, the
reasonable person may arrive at a different conclusion.
with Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 300 (1978) (“The difficulty of framing
charges in [the reasonable person] area is well recognized.”), CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER
AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM 235
(2003) (arguing in favor of a shift from a positive to a normative view of the reasonable
person), and MORAN, supra note 4, at 13 (“The unsurprising result is that the standard
too often operates as an (unjustifiable) standard of ordinariness rather than as a
(justifiable) standard of reasonableness.”).
25. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY, RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 192 (1999); see
also MORAN, supra note 4, at 287 (“Let us suppose that indifference to the interests of
others is a good general statement of the normative failing that an objective reasonableness
standard aims to capture.”). Westen also adopts something quite close to this view, at
least in the criminal law context. Westen, supra note 5, at 154 (arguing that the appropriate
standard for negligence is asking what a reasonable person would do, assuming that
hypothetical person has all of the traits of the actor except that “he fully respected the
interests of others that the statute at hand seeks to protect” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
26. Though, as we will see below, this debate has some influence over the question of
which circumstances are relevant to the test.
27. At least one commentator has suggested this is so. Moran, supra note 10, at
1240 (“[T]he case law reveals . . . not a uniform norm of reasonableness applied to all
but rather a standard that is often, though not inevitably, adjusted to mirror the actual
qualities of the litigant in question.”).
28. On this point, an interesting question—one this Article does not address—is
whether there is any difference at all between a purely subjective inquiry—asking what
the defendant herself believed—and a reasonable person test that incorporates literally
every circumstance. In other words, does it make sense to ask what a reasonable person
with all of the defendant’s particular physical and mental characteristics would believe?
Or is that precisely the same as asking what the defendant believed?
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This distinction is important because it is frequently conflated in the
literature. Burke, for example, says that “[jurors] see reasonableness in
these cases . . . because they share unspoken biases that render male
jealousy, heterosexual protectiveness, and white fears of people of color
understandable,”29 which suggests that these biases both are implicitly
included as part of the reasonable person’s circumstances and that the
very cognitive processes of juries are infected with certain undesirable
traits. And in Moran’s work, Rethinking the Reasonable Person, the author
suggests that “[a] uniform norm of reasonableness is not applied to every
individual regardless of his or her abilities. Instead, in practice the
reasonable person standard often . . . borrows heavily from the qualities
of the actual litigant.”30 The phrase “uniform norm of reasonableness”
appears to reference an account of what reasonableness is, while “the
qualities of the actual litigant” speaks more to the issue of which
circumstances are relevant.31
The second introductory issue to address concerns an analytical error
we should take care to avoid. If we decide that some of the particular
characteristics of the defendant do not form part of the reasonable person
inquiry, then we are going to have to fill in the reasonable person with
something. These are roughly what Moran calls “default characteristics,”
those that “can be displaced when that characteristic is not possessed by

29. Burke, supra note 17, at 1045 (citing LEE, supra note 24, at 17–45, 67–95,
137–74).
30. MORAN, supra note 4, at 21.
31. It is interesting to note that the inclusion of a factor in the reasonable person
test may affect either the balance of reasons a person has for acting or the very way that a
person reasons. For example, pleas to include the fact that a defendant is a child in a tort
action do not just rely on the fact that children have different reasons for action than
adults do, though they do—children derive a benefit from engaging in horseplay that
adults do not. See Lisa Belkin, In Praise of Roughhousing, N.Y. TIMES MOTHERLODE
(June 14, 2011, 3:30 AM), http://parenting.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/14/in-praise-ofroughhousing/). It also has something to do with the way that children reason: the level
of care I expect from a child is less than I expect from an adult, and this would be true
even in cases where I think that if the child were acting perfectly rationally she would do
just as the adult does. In other words, it is perfectly reasonable to expect—and to
accept—that a child will behave unreasonably. The Supreme Court seems to have recognized
and accepted that children reason differently in its recent Miranda opinion. See J.D.B. v.
North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2403 (2011) (noting that “[a] child’s age is far ‘more
than a chronological fact’” (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115 (1982))).
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the person whose behaviour is being judged[.]”32 The word displaced
here demonstrates that there must be some default or baseline to be
displaced if we conclude that a circumstance is relevant. As a result,
even if we finally determine which circumstances are “irrelevant,” we
will still implicitly be incorporating particular characteristics about those
very circumstances into the test. Consider age: In J.D.B. v. North Carolina,
the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether age was a relevant
factor in Miranda’s in-custody analysis.33 The Court found that it was
relevant, but had it followed Justice Alito’s dissent and concluded that
age does not matter, the Court would not actually be ignoring age—it
would simply assume that a reasonable person is a reasonable adult.34
And because a determination of which circumstances are relevant will
fill out, at least in part, what kind of characteristics the reasonable person
will always have, we can see that by “relevant” circumstance, I mean
something more like “variable” circumstance. Whatever one takes to be the
baseline on a given issue—what the reasonable person would look like if
we made no allowance for the individual case—calling a circumstance
“relevant” just means that it will vary based on what the defendant’s actual
circumstance was. And so there are now—at least—three issues involving
the reasonable person: we must (1) give an account of the term
reasonableness; (2) determine which circumstances are relevant—
which parts of the defendant’s situation must be incorporated into the
test; and (3) for those characteristics we determine irrelevant, decide
what characteristics the reasonable person should have.
With these introductory points out of the way, I now turn to the test
itself.
III. TOWARD A NEW REASONABLE PERSON
In this Part, I argue that the traditional method of distinguishing relevant
from irrelevant circumstances—the objective/subjective distinction—
does not offer any real guidance in parsing the reasonable person test.
This argument is a continuation of a previous essay,35 which I develop in
greater detail and build upon here. The objective/subjective distinction
is used throughout both the case law and the academic literature
32. MORAN, supra note 4, at 5. Although here it is not only those characteristics that
would be replaced if the defendant had them but also those characteristics that we decide
not to replace, even though the defendant does have them.
33. 131 S. Ct. at 2398–99.
34. See id. at 2409 (Alito, J., dissenting). There is nothing analytically wrong
with the Court holding that age is not relevant and setting the baseline at a reasonable
five-year-old, but no Justice on the Court would seriously entertain such an idea.
35. See Jackson, supra note 1.
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surrounding the reasonable person.36 For example, Peter Arenella suggests
that “[t]he objective model authorizes criminal liability whenever the
individual’s conduct has threatened or harmed social interests . . . without
regard to the actor’s subjective culpability.”37 Burke recognizes that “[a]n
ongoing theme in the scholarly debate . . . is the tension between ‘objective’
and ‘subjective’ standards.”38 She correctly notes that these terms might
refer to several different distinctions. First, by employing a “subjective”
test, we might be asking what the defendant herself actually believed;
“objective,” on the other hand, requires a comparison between the
defendant’s belief and the beliefs of the hypothetical reasonable person.39
The line between the two is easily drawn—any reference whatsoever to
a reasonable person necessarily would fall under the label “objective”—
but the distinction is unhelpful: once we decide to employ an objective
test, we must go on to consider which circumstances ought to be included in
asking how the reasonable person would act.
Burke expounds a second way of defining the objective/subjective
distinction. The terms might be used “to describe whether a jurisdiction
considers circumstances that are specific to an individual defendant when
applying the universal requirement that the defendant’s beliefs be
reasonable.” 40 “In contrast,” she says, “a wholly ‘objective’ standard of
reasonableness compares the defendant’s beliefs to those of a hypothetical
reasonable person, without taking into account the individual circumstances
of the defendant.”41 But this is nonsensical: how could we ask what a
reasonable person would do given the circumstances if we incorporate

36. E.g., Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 667, 671–76 (Haw. 1995); Kit Kinports,
Criminal Procedure in Perspective, 98 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 71 (2007).
37. Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility Defenses:
Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 831 n.21 (1977). For
other examples of discussions of the objective/subjective distinction, see Kevin Jon
Heller, Beyond the Reasonable Man? A Sympathetic but Critical Assessment of the Use
of Subjective Standards of Reasonableness in Self-Defense and Provocation Cases, 26
AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1998); Warren A. Seavey, Negligence—Subjective or Objective?, 41
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1927); supra Part II. In fact, “dominant” seems to be a more accurate
description: there are vanishingly few scholars who conceive of the reasonable person in
different terms.
38. Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense,
Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 286 (2002).
39. Id. Burke cites a number of cases that use the word subjective in this manner.
Id. at 286 n.306.
40. Id. at 287.
41. Id.
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none of the defendant’s circumstances? As Burke notes, “[I]f the defendant
stabbed a person who was holding a gun to his head and threatening to
pull the trigger, a jury would certainly be permitted to consider the
defendant’s ‘circumstance’ of having a loaded gun to his head when
determining the reasonableness of his belief . . . .”42 Several scholars have
unfortunately failed to avoid this confusion.43
And so Burke goes on to consider the most prominent way of
distinguishing objective circumstances from subjective ones.44 These two
terms are meant to capture “not the standard of reasonableness, but the
types of circumstances that the jury must take into account when assessing
reasonableness.”45 This is generally the same track that Moran considers
when she refers to the troubles caused by not having “a clear sense of
which qualities of the reasonable person matter normatively and which
do not.”46 Thus, the term objective refers to a subset of circumstances to
include in the test, which Burke suggests involves “the size of the
defendant, prior threats by the victim . . . the victim’s movements preceding
the incident, and so on.”47 Subjective factors, on the other hand, refer to
things such as the psychological peculiarities of the defendant and should
not be incorporated into the test.48 Because this third method is the
dominant one in the literature, it is worth exploring in some detail.

42. Id. at 290.
43. Westen, for example, attempts to distinguish between tests that assess a
defendant’s conduct “only by reference to idealized, impersonal, and disembodied
characteristics that make no allowances for an actor’s individual traits or foibles” and
those that incorporate “some of an actor’s individual traits and foibles.” Westen, supra
note 5, at 139. Robinson likewise makes repeated references to a “purely objective
standard,” Robinson, supra note 7, at 301, 302, as does Lee, Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee,
Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN.
L. REV. 367, 381, 387 & nn.53–54 (1996). Even the American Law Institute is liable at
least to linguistic slips when it comes to this point: Herbert Wechsler, at the floor debate
relating to a section of the Model Penal Code, said, “The standard for judging the
adequacy of [common law] provocation is the standard of the ordinary reasonable man.
You do not take into account the peculiarities of the actor, whatever they may be.”
Herbert Wechsler, A.L.I. Floor Debate Relating to Section 210.3, 36 A.L.I. PROC. 125
(1959). Kevin Heller falls into the same trap. See Heller, supra note 37, at 4.
44. This third method is more accurately described as the fourth one that Burke
discusses in her work. See Burke, supra note 38, at 290. However, the “true” third option,
which attempts to distinguish between the actual circumstances and what the defendant
believed were the actual circumstances, is a nonstarter: it does not even purport to
address a circumstance that the defendant correctly believes pertains but could not
possibly be relevant; for example, the defendant accurately believes that she has a hot
temper. See id.
45. Id.
46. MORAN, supra note 4, at 3.
47. Burke, supra note 38, at 290–91.
48. See id. at 291.
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Although this version of the objective/subjective dichotomy seems to
be promising, it is, at its core, unhelpful. There simply is no principled
way to distinguish between objective circumstances and subjective ones.
Although at first thought one might classify physical facts such as the
defendant’s height as objective, a host of others are not so easily sorted.
Take, for example, Burke’s unsubstantiated claim that “the history of
violence between the [assailant] and [the victim]” are straightforwardly
objective.49 What is it, precisely, that makes the past history of the
defendant an objective circumstance? Certainly the Supreme Court
would disagree, holding as it did that for Miranda purposes the past
interrogation history of the defendant is irrelevant to the reasonable person
inquiry.50 What makes a fact like the defendant’s past experiences so
thorny is that it points up the fact that any circumstance can be labeled
“objective,” in the sense that there is a matter of fact about it. By this I
mean that “[t]here is . . . a matter of fact about what kinds of experiences
a person had in the past and what effect they have on her reasoning.”51
We could ensure that a test incorporating any given feature X of a person
is objective by asking what a reasonable person with X would do under
the circumstances. So, for example, we could take a supposedly subjective
fact such as the defendant’s bad temper and simply ask what a reasonable
person with a bad temper would do under the circumstances. This
interpretive move would preserve the objectivity of the reasonable person
test, but it includes a factor most would intuitively classify as subjective.
And so the term objective does not have any explanatory power.
Turning to the second half of the dichotomy, perhaps the word subjective
provides some guidance. At first one might think that subjective refers
to the psychological facts about the defendant. Thus, Burke may be on
firmer ground when she asserts that “[j]urors should not, for example,
consider the evidence from the perspective of a ‘reasonable delusional
paranoid schizophrenic’ or ‘reasonable sociopath.’”52 But although
49. Id. at 292.
50. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668–69 (2004). Although given that
Yarborough involved a different area of law, it is possible the Supreme Court would
reconsider its position in the criminal law context.
51. Jackson, supra note 1, at 11.
52. Burke, supra note 38, at 293. Although it is not so clear, this really is much
firmer ground. There is significant philosophical dispute about whether physical and
psychological facts really are differences in kind, rather than degree. A great deal of
philosophical literature is devoted to the question of whether the various sciences are
reducible to physics or are instead irreducible separate fields of study. See, e.g., Jaegwon
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omitting the psychological facts from the reasonable person test sounds
simple enough, there are a number of factors readily characterized as
psychological that we would still want to import into the test. Consider
a person’s language ability. If it must be put under the heading of either
“psychological” or “nonpsychological”—and, logically speaking, it must—
it best fits into the former category: it does not “keep good company with
physical descriptors like height, weight, and eye color.”53 But a court could
not seriously rule out a defendant’s language ability in employing the
reasonable person test. For Miranda purposes, a defendant is “in custody”
if a reasonable person in her circumstances would not feel free to leave.54
Consider a situation where a person is being questioned by the police; in
the first iteration, she speaks Italian, but not English, and in the second,
she speaks English, but not Italian. If the police were to say, “You are
under arrest and you are not permitted to leave” in English, an Italianspeaking defendant could not argue that she was in custody because a
reasonable English-speaking person would not have felt free to leave.
And similarly, if the police made the same statement in Italian, an
English-speaking individual could not seriously assert that because a
reasonable Italian-speaking person would not have felt free to leave, she
should have been read her Miranda rights. Whether the suspect is in
custody will turn on whether she is able to understand what the police
officers are saying, and so the defendant’s language ability simply must
be taken into account. For the same reason, any appeal to “external” and
“internal” circumstances55 is similarly unavailing: features such as language
ability and even blindness would be improperly screened out.56
All of this suggests that there is no analytical way to determine which
characteristics are relevant and which are not. True, I am asserting a
negative, but this Article has probed the most commonly—indeed, nearly
universally—used method and demonstrated that it offers little in the
way of guidance. Moreover, as Moran has pointed out, the case law
suffers from significant cognitive dissonance in the way it reasons about
including or excluding factors.57 She notes, for example, that intelligence

Kim, Multiple Realization and the Metaphysics of Reduction, 52 P HIL . &
PHENOMENOLOGICAL RES. 1 (1992).
53. Jackson, supra note 1, at 11.
54. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 663 (quoting Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99,
112 (1995)).
55. This is the distinction Justice Alito adopts in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S.
Ct. 2394, 2411–12 (2011) (Alito, J., dissenting).
56. Jackson, supra note 1, at 12. Westen might implicitly be appealing to this
kind of distinction; for more on that score, see infra Part IV.A.2.a.
57. Moran points out several of these inconsistencies in Rethinking the Reasonable
Person. MORAN, supra note 4, at 5–6.
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is treated differently for children and adults and that physical disabilities
are treated differently from mental ones.58 Taken together, these arguments
shift the burden of persuasion on to one who would dispute this claim.
Given this conclusion, one might think it would be best to “imagine
[relevant circumstances] as a spectrum,”59 with some features clearly in,
some clearly out, and a great many falling somewhere in between. The
Model Penal Code (MPC) certainly takes this position. In defining criminal
negligence, the code says that “the actor’s failure to perceive [the risk] . . .
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
person would observe in the actor’s situation.”60 Although the MPC does
note that the actor’s intelligence, heredity, and temperament are not
relevant,61 it did not attempt to draw a clearer line between relevant and
irrelevant circumstances, saying, “There thus will be room for interpretation
of the word ‘situation,’ and that is precisely the flexibility desired.”62
However, we should not give up so easily by throwing everything to the
jury. Although it may be impossible to arrive at a perfect answer, surely
we can provide greater guidance as to which circumstances are relevant
than simply declaring that reasonable minds differ. It is to this project that I
now turn.
IV. DIFFERENT REASONS, DIFFERENT CIRCUMSTANCES
Having discussed the pitfalls of the traditional method used to sort
relevant and irrelevant circumstances, I now turn to consider some
alternatives. As Moran suggests in the context of the criminal law,

58. For example, she notes that “Vaughan v. Menlove seem[s] to respond with an
emphatic ‘yes’” to the question of whether a defendant is held to the same level of
intelligence as the reasonable person, but “courts reject this approach in the [case of]
children.” Id. at 5, 6. But as Part IV.A will make clear, Moran is implicitly relying on
what is known as “the control principle” in arguing that these distinctions are examples
of cognitive dissonance.
59. Moran, supra note 10, at 1272.
60. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2)(d) (1985) [hereinafter MPC].
61. Id. § 2.02 cmt. at 242.
62. MPC § 210.3 cmt. at 63 (1980). Though it is not clear, this is the best route to
take. Among several other reasons, recent scholarship has found evidence suggesting
that there is significant inconsistency in the way that people draw the line and that the
way a given individual comes out in a particular case is correlated with her political
beliefs. See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, The Self-Defensive Cognition of
Self-Defense, 45 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2008).
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I think we can distinguish between the culpability-determining functions of the
reasonable person . . . and the judgment-related function where the reasonable
person is employed [for a different purpose]. And these different functions
have, I would suggest, very different implications for the understanding of the
subjective and objective components of the standard.63

Moran’s intuition is roughly correct: the reasonable person test has different
functions in different contexts, and as such, the circumstances that are
relevant to the test will vary. However, as this Article argues below, Moran
does not quite go far enough: the circumstances of the reasonable person
test will vary, but they will vary depending not on just the area of law in
which it is employed but also on the underlying theory that animates a
given area of law.64 To develop this contention, I consider three areas of
law: criminal law, tort law, and the Supreme Court’s Miranda jurisprudence.
A. Criminal Law
As George Fletcher has noted, “One of the most striking particularities
of our discourse is its pervasive reliance on the term ‘reasonable.’ . . . In
criminal law, we talk incessantly of reasonable provocation, reasonable
mistake, reasonable force, and reasonable risk.”65 The MPC’s definitions
of the various levels of mens rea are perhaps the most obvious examples.
The MPC states that
[a] person acts negligently . . . when he should be aware of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk . . . . [T]he actor’s failure to perceive [the risk], considering
the nature and purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known to him,
involves a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person
would observe in the actor’s situation.66

Similarly, the MPC defines recklessly as when a person acts with conscious
disregard of a substantial and justifiable risk and says that the “risk must
be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and purpose
of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard
involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a law-abiding

63. Moran, supra note 10, at 1272. Though never fully articulated, Lee suggests
something similar when she notes that an objective standard “views social harm . . . as the
linchpin of criminal liability” while “[a] subjective model, in contrast, views culpability as
the central defining feature of criminal liability.” Lee, supra note 43, at 381.
64. This Article does not mean to rule out the possibility that there are further
subdivisions to be made: perhaps there is not a reasonable person test just for the
criminal law but rather one test for reasonable force cases and another for reasonable
mistake ones.
65. George P. Fletcher, The Right and the Reasonable, 98 HARV. L. REV. 949, 949
(1985).
66. MPC § 2.02(2)(d) (1985).
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person would observe in the actor’s situation.”67 In a similar vein, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the standard of “wanton
or reckless conduct” is satisfied if the defendant “[k]now[s] facts that
would cause a reasonable man to know the danger.”68 The MPC permits
“the use of force upon or toward another person” so long as “the actor
believes that such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of
protecting himself.”69 But section 3.09 limits the availability of this defense
in cases where “the actor is reckless or negligent in having such belief or in
acquiring or failing to acquire any knowledge or belief that is material to
the justifiability of his use of force.”70 There are of course other examples.71
Traditionally, there have been two separate justifications for imposing
criminal sanctions72: retributivism and utilitarianism.73 John Rawls has
67. Id. § 2.02(2)(c).
68. Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass. 1944).
69. MPC § 3.04(1). The high profile case involving the killing of Trayvon Martin
provides another example. There the defendant, George Zimmerman, claimed selfdefense. At the close of the evidence, the judge instructed the jury, “In deciding whether
George Zimmerman was justified in the use of deadly force, you must judge him by the
circumstances by which he was surrounded at the time the force was used.” Ta-Nehisi
Coates, Trayvon Martin and the Irony of American Justice, ATLANTIC (July 15, 2013, 5:09
AM) (citing George Zimmerman Trial: Final Jury Instructions, SCRIBD, http://www.scribd.
com/doc/153354467/George-Zimmerman-Trial-Final-Jury-Instructions (last visited Nov.
24, 2013)), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/07/trayvon-martin-and-the-iron
y-of-american-justice/277782/.
70. MPC § 3.09(2). The test thus shows up in two places in this provision: in
determining whether a particular belief was reckless or negligent and whether a fact is
material. See id. Interestingly enough, the MPC defines negligence and recklessness with the
phrase “considering the nature and purpose of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances
known to him,” which goes some way in filling out which circumstances are relevant.
See id. § 2.02(2)(c).
71. See, e.g., id. § 210.3(1)(b) (voluntary manslaughter); id. § 3.05 (defense of
others); Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999) (materiality in the context of mail
fraud); State v. Williams, 653 A.2d 902, 905 (Me. 1995) (foreseeability in the context of
accomplice liability); Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 722 (Md. 1991) (adequate
provocation); Ex parte Fraley, 111 P. 662, 663 (Okla. Crim. App. 1910) (character of
victim related to self-defense); State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ¶ 9, 63 P.3d 94 (extreme
emotional disturbance).
72. But there are others—most notably the republican theory put forward by John
Braithwaite and Philip Pettit in JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST DESERTS:
A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1990).
73. MICHAEL S. MOORE, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY: RETHINKING THE RELATIONSHIP
237 (1984) (“[T]here are two sorts of prima facie justifications of punishment—effecting
a net social gain (utilitarian) and giving just deserts (retributivist) . . . .”). Moore goes on
to consider a “mixed theory” of punishment, id., which is discussed in greater detail
below. See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
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explained that the retributivist view “is that punishment is justified on
the grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment. It is morally fitting that a
person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing.”74
Utilitarianism, in contrast, “holds that on the principle that bygones are
bygones and that only future consequences are material to present
decisions, punishment is justifiable only by reference to the probable
consequences of maintaining it as one of the devices of the social order.”75
This Article will consider these two competing theories.76
1. Utilitarianism
Today’s criminal justice system is substantially influenced by “utilitarian
reformers of the late eighteenth century and the early nineteenth century.”77
Beginning with Italian reformer Cesare Beccaria, reformers advocated
for a system of punishment that was “moderate but regular, certain, swift,
and proportioned to the threat the offense posed to society.”78 Jeremy
Bentham, probably the best known proponent of a utilitarian approach to
criminal law, systematized the movement that had been building for
decades in his seminal work Introduction to the Principles of Morals and
Legislation in 1789.79 Bentham called for a limiting condition on
punishment: “The cases in which punishment ought not to be inflicted”
include “those punishments inefficacious which have no power to produce
an effect upon the will, and which, in consequence, have no tendency
towards the prevention of like acts.”80 This concern has been distilled
into what criminologists today recognize as the three utilitarian justifications
for punishment: specific deterrence, general deterrence, and incapacitation.81

74. John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955).
75. Id. at 5.
76. It is true that these two theories are technically justifications for punishment,
not for criminal law as an institution. This Article therefore makes the assumption that
the substantive content of the criminal law should track the proper justification for
punishment: that under a utilitarian framework, the law should criminalize conduct that if
punished would lead to a better state of affairs and that under a retributivist framework, the
law should criminalize conduct that is deserving of punishment. With respect to
utilitarianism, one might instead adopt a more limited view, holding that utilitarianism
justifies the imposition of criminal punishment but does not justify or explain the
substantive criminal law. This Article discusses the possibility of this more limited utilitarian
view directly.
77. JOHN KAPLAN ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 31 (6th ed. 2008).
78. Id.
79. Id. at 31–32.
80. JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION 322 (C.K. Ogden ed., Richard
Hildreth trans., Morrison & Gibb Ltd. 1931) (1802).
81. See e.g., Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and Just
Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 284, 285–86
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The theory has gained significant traction since Beccaria and Bentham;
indeed, the nineteenth century “witness[ed] the proliferation of
penitentiaries and criminal codes [reformers] had called for.”82 Up until
the late twentieth century, “a descendant of utilitarianism dominated
criminal justice policy-making.”83 Thus, many fell in line behind the
view that the law should “assign[] punishment levels to each individual in a
fashion calculated to minimize the total social cost of crime and crime
prevention.”84
There are competing interpretations of utilitarianism. The version
espoused and defended by the likes of Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and
Henry Sidgwick—commonly known as “classical utilitarianism”—holds
“that we should always do what will maximize pleasure, or happiness,
and minimize pain, or unhappiness.85 In contrast, so-called “preference
utilitarianism” holds that “we should do what, on balance, furthers the
preferences of those affected.” 86 To keep this project manageable,
this Article limits its discussion to preference utilitarianism, most notably
advanced by Peter Singer.87
If we buy into preference utilitarianism, the criminal justice system
ought to do precisely that—maximize preference satisfaction.88 The
application of the reasonable person test, then, is rather simple on the
first run-through. In determining whether a particular factor should be
relevant to the test, we must ask whether the inclusion of that factor would
satisfy a larger number of preferences. So, for example, in determining
whether one can claim that she was not criminally negligent because of
her age, that will depend on whether the inclusion of age as a factor in
the reasonable person test will lead to a larger number of preferences
being satisfied. But as with any application of utilitarianism to a real-

(2002); Mark C. Stafford & Mark Warr, A Reconceptualization of General and Specific
Deterrence, 30 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 357 (1993).
82. KAPLAN ET AL., supra note 77, at 32.
83. BRAITHWAITE & PETTIT, supra note 72, at 2.
84. Louis Michael Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory
and the Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 315–18 (1984).
85. PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 13 (3d ed. 2011).
86. Id. (emphasis added).
87. E.g., PETER SINGER, ANIMAL LIBERATION 5 (Harper Perennial 2009); SINGER,
supra note 85, at 13.
88. Though some theoretical work would still have to be done filling out what
count as “preferences.” For a related discussion, see infra pp. 690–93 (discussion of the
definition of costs in the law and economics context).
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world scenario, complications inevitably arise. Adopting a utilitarian view
of the criminal law turns the questions involved in applying the reasonable
person test from the normative into the empirical. This is hardly something
a utilitarian would take pains to quibble with, but it is worth noting.
A more traditional approach to criminal law might consider normative
questions: whether it is just to sanction an individual in a particular case,
whether the state ought to use its coercive power to prevent this kind of
conduct, and so on. But a utilitarian approaches the matter much
differently: questions in criminal law will not turn on the arguments
expounded by philosophers and political theorists but on the data collected
by social scientists.89
Moreover, utilitarianism assumes that it would be possible to reach a
definitive answer to these empirical questions. But as Don Herzog once
noted, “As far as I know, no one has ever attempted even a sketch of [the
decision utilitarianism demands] for any actual problem. . . . For good
reason, too: we would need to know unfathomably more about
consequences and individuals than we do or can know.”90 For example,
in trying to determine whether a particular factor is relevant in assessing
a self-defense claim, the quick-and-dirty analysis is whether taking into
account that factor would reduce the number of killings. But this is
woefully incomplete because there are an “unfathomable” number of other
effects besides the raw number of killings radiating out of the decision to
include or exclude a particular factor that would affect preference
satisfaction, and it would be difficult indeed to map perfectly all of those
ripple effects.
Adopting a utilitarian approach to criminal law might also require us to
reject our intuitions about the reasonable person test. We might wonder
whether the factors relevant to the test should stay constant across
different defendants or if instead we should decide the issue on a caseby-case basis and say, for example, that Defendant #1’s past history of
abuse is relevant in determining whether she can make out a self-defense
claim but Defendant #2’s past history of abuse cannot be considered
though she makes precisely the same argument.91 Or perhaps it turns out

89. For a more detailed discussion of some of the empirical questions involved in
adopting a utilitarian approach to criminal law, see infra notes 99–102.
90. DON HERZOG, WITHOUT FOUNDATIONS: JUSTIFICATION IN POLITICAL THEORY
131 (1985).
91. This can be aptly analogized to the distinction between act utilitarianism,
which holds that one ought to do the action that maximizes utility, and rule utilitarianism,
which holds that one ought to act in conformity with the rule that maximizes utility. In
both cases the distinction is illusory: both theories are grounded in the justification that
they will maximize utility. But it is an empirical question which theory best maximizes
utility, and a utilitarian would be obligated to follow whichever one does so. For an
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that in self-defense cases, utility is maximized only when we refuse to
consider the physical strength of the defendant or the fact that the victim
was armed with a deadly weapon. For these reasons, it is not possible to
say much of anything about what the reasonable person test should look
like under a utilitarian view: because the question is entirely dependent
on empirical questions, every facet of the test is open to revision. The
most we can say is that the question as to whether a particular factor is
relevant to the test will turn on whether the inclusion of the factor will
maximize utility.92 Any suggestion beyond this simple proposition is open
to empirical criticism.
Of course, as noted above, utilitarianism is not just a theory of criminal
law—it is a general one of normative ethics.93 But most utilitarian
justifications for punishment are more narrowly tailored. Rather than
taking a full-on utilitarian approach where the maximization of utility is
a maxim to be applied across all contexts, many utilitarian criminologists
cabin their weighing of costs and benefits to the criminal law only.94
Criminal law, the argument goes, ought only to be concerned with the
reduction of crime.95 In the field of tort law, Scott Hershovitz notes that
economists ignore tort’s collateral costs and benefits “to keep their
models of tort tractable”96: it would be impossible to create a model that
perfectly captures each and every causal effect tort law has, but there is

extended discussion of this issue, see DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM
62–118 (1965); J. J. C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 3,
9–12 (1973).
This issue is just one of the many ways in which critiques are leveled against
utilitarianism on grounds that it requires us to give up some of our most basic intuitions.
See, e.g., H. J. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, 8 INQUIRY 249,
253–54 (1965). In the context of the criminal law, it is frequently noted that utilitarianism
might justify framing the innocent, inflicting excessive punishment, adopting illegitimate
trial procedures, and criminalizing noncriminal behavior such as one’s political affiliations.
E.g., id.
92. And even that statement is subject to revision if it turns out that the
application of the reasonable person test in the criminal law brings about less utility than,
say, a purely subjective test. Or perhaps utilitarianism demands that the criminal law be
abolished altogether. For a more in-depth discussion on this last point, see Gilbert M.
Cantor, An End to Crime and Punishment, SHINGLE, May 1976, at 1.
93. See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 85, at 10–11.
94. See e.g., Scott Hershovitz, Harry Potter and the Trouble with Tort Theory, 63
STAN. L. REV. 67, 85 (2010).
95. Thus, the reason why a person is interested in the reduction of crime might be
on nonutilitarian grounds.
96. Hershovitz, supra note 94, at 85.
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still some value in creating the more narrowly tailored model focusing
only on accident costs, “even though our epistemic limitations entail that
any conclusions we reach will be qualified and tentative.”97 Similarly, it
might be better to narrow the scope of our utilitarian approach to
criminal law and take it as given that we should “manipulate punishment
and enforcement levels so as to reduce the social cost of crime and crime
prevention to some theoretical minimum.”98
This line of thinking finds support in the way utilitarian criminologists
approach the criminal law. As James Q. Wilson noted, in applying a
utilitarian rationale to punishment, we must grapple with a variety of
empirical factors about the way that human beings respond to rewards
and punishments including whether people are “incapable of assessing
the risks” of their actions in the first place and whether and to what extent
“would-be offenders are reasonably rational and respond [rationally] to
their perception of the costs and benefits attached to alternative courses
of action.”99 Scholars have debated whether increasing the severity, rather
than the probability, of punishment has any deterrent effect.100 Similarly,
some criminologists have argued that the deterrent effects of crime are
“front-loaded,” so that the “initial humiliation and stigma . . . comes at the
beginning of the term and is not increased by adding additional years [to
the sentence].”101 Dan M. Kahan has noted that empirical studies on the
reasons why people obey the law “reveal a strong correlation between a
person’s obedience and her perception of others’ behavior and attitudes
toward the law” and a correspondingly weak correlation between obedience
and the threat of punishment.102 In each of these discussions, the implicit
assumption is that the purpose of the criminal law is not simply to maximize
utility but to efficiently reduce the costs associated with criminal activity.
Perhaps this approach will get more traction in determining which
circumstances are relevant to the reasonable person test.
Unfortunately, that is not the case: the adoption of utilitarianism in this
narrow sense does not tell us anything about the factors relevant to the
reasonable person inquiry. In many cases the reasonable person test is

97. Id. at 86.
98. See Seidman, supra note 84, at 317 n.7.
99. JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 117–21 (rev. ed. 1983).
100. See Anthony N. Doob & Cheryl Marie Webster, Sentence Severity and Crime:
Accepting the Null Hypothesis, 30 CRIME & JUST. 143, 181–89 (2003) (conducting a
literature review on the subject and concluding that “[w]e could find no conclusive
evidence that supports the hypothesis that harsher sentences reduce crime through the
mechanism of general deterrence”).
101. Seidman, supra note 84, at 331.
102. Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L.
REV. 349, 354 (1997).
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used to determine whether a particular action is criminal. Fact finders
apply the reasonable person test in crimes involving recklessness and
negligence to determine whether the defendant has committed a criminal
act,103 in self-defense cases to tell us whether the defendant’s actions are
excused,104 and so on. But if we are operating under a framework
that seeks to reduce crime, we must first decide what kind of conduct we
are going to label “criminal.” It makes little sense to talk about crime
reduction when the issue depends on whether the conduct is prohibited
in the first place—we have begged the question. Although the point being
made here is relatively narrow, it has a much broader application and can
be easily overlooked. Utilitarian justifications for criminal punishment are
covertly dependent on having a robust sense of what ought to be prohibited.
That robust sense must come from either a broader commitment to
utilitarianism—discussed above—or some other, nonutilitarian theory.105
Whether one takes issue with my conclusions on utilitarianism as
applied to the criminal law, I have at least laid out the framework that a
utilitarian would seek to apply in making doctrinal decisions involving
the reasonable person test: we should decide to include or exclude factors
based on whether they maximize “utility,” however one defines that
term—whether in terms of preference satisfaction generally, the social
costs of crime, or something else altogether.
Having surveyed how utilitarian approaches to criminal law would
approach the reasonable person test, I now turn to consider what a
blamed-based account of criminal law has to say on the matter.
2. Retributivism
Retributivism is most often associated with the German philosopher
Immanuel Kant, who famously argued,
Juridicial Punishment can never be administered merely as a means for
promoting another Good . . . but must in all cases be imposed only because the
individual on whom it is inflicted has committed a Crime. . . . [W]oe to him

103. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
105. A utilitarian in this second sense might adopt a blame-based view of the
criminal law, as this Article discusses in Part IV.A.2, to fill in this gap.
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who creeps through the serpent-windings of Utilitarianism to discover some
advantage that may discharge him from the Justice of Punishment . . . .106

On this view it is a moral good to punish the blameworthy, apart from
any consequences that might result. Until the 1970s, very few legal
scholars took a retributive approach to criminal law.107 But beginning at
that time, retributivism underwent a renaissance of sorts.108
It is worth noting that the so-called “mixed theory” of punishment—
discussed briefly above—would fit under the retributivist label for this
Article’s purposes. Under a mixed theory, two conditions are necessary
for the justification of punishment: “[T]he person on whom [punishment] is
imposed is found to have committed an offense under circumstances that
permit his conduct to be characterized as blameworthy,” and the
punishment must be “designed to prevent the commission of offenses.”109
Moral blame, in other words, is a “limiting principle,”110 and therefore
the mixed-bag theorist will have to take retributivist concerns fully into
account.111
As mentioned, the retributivist holds that the criminal law may only
punish the blameworthy. Therefore, the question of what factors are
relevant in the reasonable person test will turn on whether the inclusion
or exclusion of a given factor will more accurately capture when a person is
to blame. To determine what factors are relevant, then, we must first know
what it is that makes a person blameworthy and thus subject to punishment.
To make our discussion manageable, this Article will limit itself to one
promising candidate: Peter Westen’s theory that a person is to blame for
failing to “manifest[] appropriate ex ante concern on his part for” certain
interests.112 I focus on Westen’s theory primarily because, as we shall
see, his interpretation of blame garners significant support across a wide

106. IMMANUEL KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie trans., Scribner &
Welford 1887) (1796–1797).
107. BRAITHWAITE & PETTIT, supra note 72, at 2.
108. Id. at 2–5.
109. HERBERT L. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 62 (1968).
110. Id. at 66; see also Alan H. Goldman, The Paradox of Punishment, 9 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 42, 48 (1979) (“[The mixed theory of punishment] views the social goal of
punishment as deterrence, and yet recognizes that we are entitled to pursue this goal only
when we restrict deprivation of rights to those forfeited through crime or wrongdoing.”).
111. There is one way in which the mixed-bag theory and retributivism come apart.
If the inclusion or exclusion of a particular factor to the reasonable person test (1) would
not lead to the punishing of the morally blameless and (2) would prevent the commission
of offenses, then a mixed-bag theorist would have reason to include or exclude that
factor while a retributivist would have no reason to either way. Because this would be a
highly unusual circumstance, this Article cabins the issue off for purposes of this
discussion.
112.
Westen, supra note 5, at 142–43.
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variety of academics due to its implicit reliance on what is known as the
“control principle”—the idea that a person can be to blame only for that
which she could control.113
a. Westen’s Account
Westen begins by distinguishing two types of reasonableness—a
distinction that he argues is frequently overlooked in the literature. As a
“tentative distinction,” Westen notes that there is a difference between
the claim that one did not engage in unlawful conduct and the claim that
one is not culpable.114 Westen articulates the difference in terms of actus
reus and mens rea, although he does not use those terms,115 but it is
probably better understood as the difference between obligation and blame:
the question of what I am obligated to do is not the same as asking what
I am to blame for. Westen notes that this distinction is significant “because,
although reasonableness often exculpates in each respect, the traits that
are selected to constitute a reasonable person vary accordingly.”116 In
other words, fact finders will apply the reasonable person test differently
to determine what kind of conduct is prohibited than when determining

113.
For a discussion of academics that also rely on the control principle in the
context of the reasonable person test, see infra text accompanying note 160. Compare
Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. to Harold J. Laski (Dec. 17, 1925), in 1 HOLMESLASKI LETTERS 806 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1953) (“If I were having a philosophical
talk with a man [about to be executed] I should say, I don’t doubt that your act was
inevitable for you but to make it more avoidable by others we propose to sacrifice you to
the common good. You may regard yourself as a soldier dying for your country if you
like. But the law must keep its promises.”).
114. Westen, supra note 5, at 140–41.
115. See id. at 141 (referring to “lack of unlawful conduct” and “lack of
culpability”). Westen argues that lack of culpability is a case where “despite bringing
about the specified state of affairs that a statute explicitly seeks to prevent, [a person]
nevertheless lacks the accompanying culpability that the statute requires.” Id. But the
mens rea requirement is an element of a given offense and is a part of that which the
statute “explicitly seeks to prevent,” making this an odd way to phrase the distinction.
Westen tries to avoid this difficulty by implying that a statute is keyed toward preventing
a particular state of affairs, but this fails to recognize (a) mens rea is a necessary
condition for criminal liability and (b) not all criminal statutes are phrased in terms of
states of affairs. The MPC, for example, explicitly distinguishes elements that relate to
nature of the conduct, attendant circumstances, and result of conduct. E.g., MPC
§ 2.02(2) (1985) (laying out the definition of various levels of mens rea and how they
apply to each of those three categories).
116. Westen, supra note 5, at 141.
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whether a particular defendant is blameworthy.117 “[W]hen reasonableness
functions as a standard of conduct, it operates as a measure of the
lawfulness of end-states of affairs . . . . And, as such, its personification, the
‘reasonable person,’ rightly consists of idealized characteristics that make
no allowances for an actor’s individual traits or foibles.”118 This kind of
reasonableness—“Reasonableness-1,” in his parlance—can be determined
without any reference to the particular characteristics of the defendant.119
When we ask, for example as the MPC does, whether the risk the actor
consciously disregarded was “substantial” and “unjustifiable,” we need not
impart any fact about the actor herself; questions regarding the degree of the
risk “are entirely a function of which risks the people of the state regard
as acceptable and unacceptable—not a function of contrary or dissenting
perceptions, emotions or judgments by individual actors.”120
In contrast, when the reasonable person test is used to determine whether
an agent is culpable, we must employ “Reasonableness-2,” which inquires
whether the defendant “manifests appropriate ex ante concern on his
part for [the] interests” the statute seeks to protect.121 When used in this
context, Reasonableness-2 does take into account the actor’s individual
traits.122 Moreover, it must do so because “Reasonableness-2 cannot rightly
function as a measure of an actor’s ex ante individual blameworthiness
without making allowances for individual traits that, through no fault of
his own, preclude him from forming the attitudes or beliefs regarding
[the requirements of the relevant statute].”123 And so when the MPC
inquires whether a person’s allegedly negligent conduct constitutes a gross
deviation “from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe
in his situation,”124 we must inquire into the actor’s particular traits.125
117. In fact, Westen contends there is no fact that is always relevant or always
irrelevant in the reasonable person inquiry. See id. at 149. Although this Article does
not explore it here, this assertion trades on two different readings of the word relevant—
one relating to causal efficacy and the other relating to the circumstances that should be
captured by the reasonable person test.
118. Id. at 141 (footnote omitted). Note again that Westen presumes criminal
statutes speak only in terms of results, rather than in terms of attendant circumstances or
the nature of the conduct itself.
119. Id. at 142.
120. Id. at 145.
121. Id. at 142–43.
122. Id. at 143.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 147 (quoting MPC § 2.02 cmt. (1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
125. Interestingly, Westen’s distinction between Reasonableness-1 and Reasonableness2 collapses under a utilitarian framework: in both cases, the question is what factors, if
included, would maximize preference satisfaction. Although Westen thinks one is about
conduct and the other about blame, utilitarians do not make that kind of distinction a
priori and would adopt it only if it led to the right sort of outcome.
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There is a lot going on here, but two points are worth highlighting.
First, Westen is presupposing a rigid connection between a defendant’s
level of culpability and the extent to which he “manifests appropriate . . .
concern” about the interests the statute seeks to protect.126 His account
of culpability is, roughly, that it is a declaration that a person was not
“motivated in his conduct by proper regard for interests that the law
seeks to safeguard.”127 Without this connection, there would be no reason
to think Reasonableness-2 accurately captures culpability. Second, Westen
presupposes a separate yet equally rigid connection between culpability
and the “control principle”128—the proposition that a person is
responsible only for that which she has control over.129 Westen at times
phrases it in terms of “making allowances” for traits that it is not the
defendant’s “fault” for having, but the underlying intuition is the same:
we cannot blame a person for something that she could not control.
The application of Westen’s Reasonableness-1/Reasonableness-2
distinction is meant to get some traction on the larger question this
Article poses: What circumstances are relevant to the reasonable person
inquiry? Or, in Westen’s words, “Which of an actor’s many traits are
relevant to assessing his culpability . . . ?”130 Reasonableness-1 is relatively
straightforward—because it is meant to generate a particular standard of
conduct, we need not include any of the defendant’s personal characteristics.
Reasonableness-2, however, which is meant to capture the actor’s
culpability, has to consider at least some of the actor’s characteristics.
Westen’s argument on this point is worth quoting at length:
Since a “reasonable person” in negligence and voluntary manslaughter cases is
an objective and personified standard by which to assess an actor’s criminal
blameworthiness, and since criminal blame is a judgment of an actor’s values, it
follows that a reasonable person in negligence and voluntary manslaughter

126. Westen, supra note 5, at 142–43.
127. Id. at 151. More on this account of blame later.
128. See Christopher Jackson, Tort, Moral Luck, and Blame, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
57, 61–62 (2012).
129. E.g., Westen, supra note 5, at 147 (“[B]ecause an actor ‘should’ be aware of
only what he can be aware . . . .”); id. at 141 (noting that a defendant always has a
defense if “he nevertheless lacks the accompanying culpability that the statute requires”);
id. at 143 (using the language of “through no fault of his own”); id. at 143–44 (using
blindness and being of below-average intelligence as factors that are outside of one’s
control and thus not blameworthy); id. at 144 (“To avoid blaming the blameless, the
criminal law must be willing to make allowances for individual traits in assessing
individual blameworthiness.”).
130. Id. at 148 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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cases is a construct that consists of all of what an actor is—including every
physical, psychological and emotional trait—except that it also fully embodies
the values of the people of the state as incorporated in the statute at hand
regarding the rights and duties of persons.131

Westen is connecting his account of blame—a judgment about the actor’s
failure to appropriately take into account certain interests or values—to
the reasonable person test as applied in cases seeking Reasonableness-2.
Doing so, he suggests, resolves most of the thorny issues involved with
the reasonable person test in the criminal law. Because Reasonableness2 incorporates all of an actor’s traits, including those “that are not within
his control and not his fault,” it “avoids the problem of condemning
actors for mental states or emotions they cannot help.”132 Conversely, it
does not excuse actors for traits they are capable of controlling because
“while the test incorporates those faults, it expects actors to respond to
them in the way that a person with proper values would respond to such
dispositions – namely, by subjecting them to the controls and compensatory
actions of which he is capable to prevent them from manifesting
themselves.”133 Thus, we have our answer. In the context of the criminal
law, the reasonable person test can be broken down into two subissues.
When we are concerned about Reasonableness-1 and assessing conduct,
we include no factors particular to the defendant. When we are dealing
with Reasonableness-2 and assessing culpability, we include all of the
defendant’s particular characteristics, except that we imagine our reasonable
person manifests appropriate regard for the interests the statute at hand
seeks to protect.
b. Critiquing Westen
This Article focuses its criticism of Westen’s theory on three points:
the application of the reasonable person test to issues involving
Reasonableness-1, his account of blame, and his formulation of the
reasonable person test.
Beginning with Reasonableness-1, Westen argues that we need not
incorporate any of the actor’s characteristics when the reasonable person
test is being used to determine whether the actor’s conduct was wrongful.
But even in cases where we are not using the reasonable person test to
measure culpability, we will still have to make the inevitably difficult
choices about which characteristics are relevant. If we adopt Westen’s
interpretation of the MPC’s definition of recklessness and apply it to a

131.
132.
133.
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[VOL. 50: 651, 2013]

Reasonable Persons
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

homicide case, a guilty verdict would require a finding that the defendant
was conscious of a substantial and unjustifiable risk and proceeded to act
in the face of that risk.134 Even if we adopt Westen’s position that the
terms substantial and unjustifiable are “entirely a function of which risks
the people of the state regard as acceptable and unacceptable,”135 we
must still ask whether the people of the state would regard the risk as
acceptable or not given the circumstances. That is, we cannot make the
“objective” judgment that a particular risk is unacceptable without
knowing the surrounding facts. This is true in the most basic sense that
it would be impossible to describe what the risk is without making
reference to at least some of the surrounding facts. For example, by saying
that firing a gun risks another person’s death, we have already filled out
the situation to say that the act the defendant took was the firing of a gun
and that doing so risked a causal chain of events leading to another’s
death. But more broadly, it would be impossible to evaluate a given risk
without having some idea of the context surrounding it: the decision to
fire a gun near an innocent bystander looks awfully unjustifiable until
we take note of the fact that the person firing is a police officer and that
she is doing it because an armed assailant is pointing his weapon at an
innocent’s head and is about to pull the trigger.
Westen might try to rely on a distinction between the internal
characteristics of the defendant and the external facts of the situation. It
is true, he might say, that we have to take account of the fact that the
defendant is a police officer and that she is taking a shot to prevent the
loss of an innocent life, but we will not be importing any circumstance
about her. We can incorporate the external circumstances of the situation
without considering the internal facts of the defendant herself. But this
distinction is unavailing for the reasons laid out in Part III.136 The fact
that the police officer is a police officer is a fact about the defendant, and
the same goes for the fact that the police officer is either blind or able to

134. There is a little more at play in the way that Westen deals with the
requirement that the defendant’s conduct be a gross deviation from the conduct a lawabiding person would observe. But to avoid making the issue complex, it is enough to
say that this Article’s formulation is a necessary condition for a finding of recklessness,
though not sufficient for such a finding.
135. Westen, supra note 5, at 145.
136. See supra Part III; see also Jackson, supra note 1.
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see or that the defendant does or does not understand English.137 These
facts are clearly relevant to an inquiry about recklessness and are equally
clearly “about the defendant” or “internal” to her, rather than facts “about
the situation” or “external” to her. As Westen recognizes, “‘[R]isk’ is an
epistemic concept and, hence, is defined by reference to a real or imaginary
person’s viewpoint.”138 And because it is defined by reference to a
particular viewpoint, it must take into account at least some facts about
that viewpoint, thus making unavoidable our obligation to answer the
question: which facts must it take into account?
Interestingly enough, the way we would go about determining which
circumstances are relevant for Reasonableness-1 is going to depend on
what kind of conduct we consider wrongful. It is relevant that the assailant
is about to shoot an innocent victim in determining whether it was reckless
for a police officer to fire her weapon at the assailant, and it is relevant
only because I am assuming that this kind of action—using force to save
the life of an innocent at the expense of harming an aggressor—is not
wrongful. My commitments in normative ethics also lead me to believe
that the gender of the assailant does not change the outcome—whether
the assailant is a man or a woman, the police officer’s conduct is still
justified. And as a result, we could safely read out gender of the assailant
as a relevant circumstance. These examples are uncontroversial, but we
could certainly manufacture some controversy by switching up the
hypothetical. Suppose the police officer is taking aim at a doctor about to
perform an abortion. In that case, whether we think the action is
wrongful will depend in part on our views about abortion. And this of
course just feeds back into the broader thesis of this Article: the
circumstances we consider relevant in applying the reasonable person
test will vary depending on the underlying theories we hold.
Westen’s account of recklessness under the MPC presupposes a tight
connection between his interpretation of recklessness and culpability. If
inquiring into whether an actor was reckless does not require us to take
into account any of the individual’s particular characteristics—it is just
whether or not she consciously disregarded a risk that society has
determined is unacceptably large—and if the criminal law is meant to
track blameworthiness—so that it would be wrong for the law to punish
a person who is not culpable—then we have to assume that in any case
where a person is reckless, she necessarily is blameworthy. In other words,
there can be no case where a person is reckless but not to blame; otherwise
137. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 11; supra p. 662. Another example might
include the age of the defendant: what we consider reckless conduct in adults is probably
not the same class of actions we consider reckless for a child.
138. Westen, supra note 5, at 144 n.32.
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the criminal law would be in the business of criminally punishing
defendants for reckless conduct even though they are not culpable for
their actions.139 Moreover, let us assume as Westen does that the control
principle holds so that an agent is culpable only for that which she had
control over.140 Then, we have a pretty strong assumption about the
control principle: although one’s failure to perceive a risk may or may
not be in her control, one’s disregard of a risk is always within her
control. And there is no reason to think that this is true. It would not be
very difficult to dream up scenarios where a person did in fact act recklessly
but was not able to do otherwise. As Westen argues, we cannot hold a
person responsible for that which she cannot control because doing so
“would mean assessing the culpability of profoundly retarded actors like
Of Mice and Men’s Lennie by a standard of care that we know they
cannot attain and are not at fault for failing to attain.”141 The same
argument applies in cases of recklessness: in what sense would it be fair
to judge a person culpable for consciously disregarding a risk when we
know she could not have done otherwise?142 Thus, I am skeptical that
Westen’s interpretation of recklessness, even coupled with a complete
account of which circumstances are relevant, accurately tracks what the
criminal law is up to.
The second major area of criticism in Westen’s theory involves his
account of blame. He begins by asserting that “[b]lameworthiness is a
feature that persons reveal about themselves through their acts.”143 This
strongly suggests that his definition of blame is character-based. But in
the very next sentence, Westen says, “To publicly blame a person is to
declare that he acted with a certain kind of motivation or attitude.”144
This in contrast suggests that blame has much to do with a person’s mental

139. See id. at 143.
140. See id.
141. Id. at 149.
142. Westen seems to recognize the plausibility of this line of reasoning when he
says that it would be a problem if a jury could not consider “difficulties that actors
possess in controlling themselves that are neither within the actors’ control nor their
fault,” giving a war veteran suffering from PTSD as an example. Id. at 150. But he never
delves into the issue or suggests how this does not pose a problem for his interpretation
of recklessness. See id.
143. Id. at 151.
144. Id.
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states.145 But Westen goes further, suggesting that blaming an actor “is
to declare that he acted with a certain kind of motivation or attitude.
Specifically, it is to adjudge that . . . the person placed insufficient value on
[the interests that the law seeks to safeguard].”146 And he interprets that
to refer to mens rea—purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.147
Thus, Westen is quite ambivalent about whether blame tracks a person’s
character or her mental states. If he intends to equate mens rea and
mental states more broadly with not placing sufficient value on the interests
the state seeks to safeguard, then he is again making an implicit
assumption that is rather hard to defend: that by acting with a particular
mental state, you are demonstrating that you do not have a particular
character trait—placing sufficient value on the right interests. And this
is a dubious account of human action if only because there is such a
thing as acting out of character. I might do some action and do it with a
particular mental state, yet it still may be true that this has little to no bearing
on whether I take certain interests seriously.148 I could, for example, take
very seriously society’s interest in protecting human life but still commit
a murder out of pure rage.
The third and final critique of Westen’s interpretation of the reasonable
person test involves the way that he connects culpability to the test itself.
Westen brings the two together under the rubric of Reasonableness-2:
when the criminal law is inquiring about the culpability of the defendant
and uses the reasonable person test, then the proper question is to ask
what a person who possessed all of the defendant’s characteristics would
do, “except that [the reasonable person] also fully embodies the values
of the people of the state as incorporated in the statute at hand regarding
the rights and duties of persons.”149 Presumably, if the two conflict so
that one of the defendant’s characteristics is a failure to properly respect
the state’s values, the state’s values, rather than the defendant’s, trump.
The idea behind this formulation is that because blameworthiness is a
judgment of the actor’s values, in criminal law the thing that we are blaming

145. It seems possible to argue that the thing a person reveals about herself through
her acts is just the motivation that she acted with. But that is a strained reading of the
text and one at odds with Westen’s larger point, as discussed below.
146. Westen, supra note 5, at 151.
147. Id.
148. Westen might be trying to say that by acting in a certain manner I have
evidenced that I do not take the relevant values seriously to the extent that I performed
that particular action. But I think he is going to want to avoid this formulation because
doing so essentially collapses the distinction between mens rea and placing value on
particular interests, which would call into question his ultimate formulation of the
reasonable person test.
149. Westen, supra note 5, at 151.
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a defendant for is his failure to properly respect the values we have
decided are important by enacting the criminal code. But it is very difficult
to determine which values the people have embedded in the “statute at
hand.”150 Without going into too much detail, what, for example, does a
defendant fail to respect by violating a regulatory offense? Is it respect
for the state’s law? The importance of being part of a regulatory regime
that brings about a better state of affairs? It is intuitively possible—and
indeed likely—that the reason why the state chose to criminalize some
conduct is not the same reason that we think a person is blameworthy for
engaging in it.151
In any case, the primary issue I want to address is that Westen’s test is
both underinclusive and overinclusive. It is underinclusive because it fails
to account for characteristics that are at odds with society’s values with
respect to the statute at hand but still outside of the defendant’s control.
Westen adheres closely to the control principle: it would be unjust, he
argues, to hold blameworthy an actor who could not have done otherwise.152
But the reasonable person test as applied to Reasonableness-2 holds actors
responsible for that which is not under their control. It is possible to fail
to show appropriate respect for society’s values and not have any control
over this failure. Consider Westen’s treatment of State v. Williams,153
where two Native American parents of below-average intelligence were
convicted of manslaughter for the death of their infant son after they failed
to seek medical care for several weeks for an abscessed tooth that eventually
developed into pneumonia.154 Westen provides sample jury instructions

150. Id.
151. One pertinent example comes from a hypothetical case posed in an environmental
crimes class. In breach of the Clean Water Act, the defendant dumped thousands of
gallons of gasoline down the sewer on a street corner, which put the children attending a
nearby elementary school in serious jeopardy because the gasoline was sufficiently
concentrated that it was liable to ignite and explode. In that case, the reasons that the
defendant was blameworthy do not track at all the values the Clean Water Act was meant
to instantiate when Congress passed it into law. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2006) (stating
that the goal of the Clean Water Act “is to restore and maintain the chemical, physical,
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”).
152. Westen doubles down on this theory when he says, “The test thus avoids the
problem of condemning actors for mental states or emotions they cannot help.” Westen,
supra note 5, at 151.
153. 484 P.2d 1167 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971).
154. Id. at 1169–70, 1173; see also Westen, supra note 5, at 152–53 (discussing the
State v. Williams decision).
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that are meant to be a practical application of his thesis to the crime of
negligent homicide. The jury is to be told,
[Y]ou must determine whether it was reasonable for it not to have occurred to
[the defendants] that William’s life might be in danger. To do so, you shall
take into account everything you know about [the defendants]—including their
education, experience with . . . children, their level of intelligence, their
ethnicity—with one exception. [Y]ou shall reserve judgment about whether
[they] are telling the truth when they say how much they loved and cared about
William’s physical well-being . . . . [Y]ou shall bear in mind that the people of
Washington expect every parent to care deeply and continually about his or her
child’s continued survival . . . .155

But what if it turns out that the defendants did not care “deeply and
continually about” their child, yet they could not have done otherwise? In
such a case, Westen’s adoption of the control principle cannot be reconciled
with his interpretation of the reasonable person test. Paradoxically, the
more values the criminal law expresses, the less we may take into account
the defendant’s personal characteristics and, on Westen’s interpretation,
the more likely it is that we will criminally punish a defendant who is
not to blame for her actions.
Similarly, Westen’s theory is overinclusive because it permits
consideration of traits that are the actor’s fault for having. There are
certain features about me that are my fault because I have either cultivated
them or failed to cultivate better traits. It would be my fault for having a
hot temper if I have cultivated that trait and likewise my fault if I have a
hot temper even though I could have taken steps to overcome that trait—
by, say, taking anger management classes. There would therefore be no
reason to take those traits into account in applying the reasonable person
test. If I am disposed to random bouts of violent rages but am able to
control these outbursts, there is little reason to think that, if I am charged
with reckless murder, the jury should consider what a reasonable person
prone to violent rages would have done. But under Westen’s view, so
long as these traits do not conflict with the values the statute at hand was
meant to instantiate, they must be included in the reasonable person test.
Westen tries to respond to the criticism:
[T]he test also avoids the problem of excusing actors for faults of character
they are capable of controlling or compensating for, because while the test
incorporates those faults, it expects actors to respond to them in the way that a
person with proper values would respond to such dispositions – namely, by
subjecting them to the controls and compensatory actions of which he is
capable to prevent them from manifesting themselves.156

155.
156.
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But this only narrows the applicability of the criticism; it does not avoid
it all together. The list of things that I am capable of controlling does
not perfectly correspond to the list of things that society values. There
are still some things that I am responsible for that are not covered by
society’s values instantiated by the law. And there is no reason those should
be included in the reasonable person test. Think again to an aggressive
temperament, or perhaps more egregiously, to harboring racist attitudes.
It could hardly be right to say that a person charged with reckless murder
must be compared to the violent person or the reasonable racist.157 And
it is no answer to say that the state’s laws, broadly construed, also evidence
values contrary to racism. First, we can imagine a state that has not passed
any laws with respect to racism. Second, this makes the application of
the reasonable person test all the more difficult: how could we know all
of the competing values that the law of the state—from tort to the criminal
code to regulatory offenses to the state’s constitution—is meant to embody
or how to commensurate those oft-competing values? Westen himself
refers only to “the statute at hand,” and my hunch is that he does so to
avoid these concerns.158
The heart of my objection on grounds of both overinclusiveness and
underinclusiveness rests on Westen’s peculiar account of blame. There
is a significant tension between his adoption of the control principle and his
assertion that blame is about an agent’s failure to take into account
particular values. My criticism would have significantly less bite if Westen
reformulated his theory of blame. And this observation leads me into
the final subpart of this Article’s discussion on blame-based accounts of
the criminal law: some lessons that we can draw from the foregoing
discussion.

157. See Armour, supra note 24, at 787–88. Jeremy Horder offers another example:
“[I]n a duress case, a threat to terminate a pregnancy by kicking the defendant in the
stomach can hardly be properly assessed . . . without taking into account that that person
is a pregnant woman.” Jeremy Horder, Can the Law Do Without the Reasonable Person?,
55 U. TORONTO L.J. 253, 264 n.36 (2005).
158. Westen, supra note 5, at 151. Though there is one significant inconsistency:
In proffering the jury instructions in Williams, Westen makes the undefended assertion
that it is Washington State’s considered judgment that parents always care deeply about
their children. Id. at 155. It certainly is not obvious that this is found in Washington’s
manslaughter statute.
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c. Lessons & Other Theories
I have spent a fair amount of time analyzing and critiquing Westen’s
account of the reasonable person in the criminal law. I have taken this
approach partly because his theory is rich enough to warrant sustained
dialogue but also because doing so motivates the broader discussion.
Recall the hypothesis, set out in the beginning of Part IV.A.1, that if we
adopt a blame-based view of the criminal law, the factors relevant to the
reasonable person test will depend on whether the inclusion or exclusion
of a given factor will more accurately capture blameworthy conduct.
We considered Westen’s theory of blame and his application of that
theory to the reasonable person test, and we saw that his account of
blame drives his application of the reasonable person test to the criminal
law. The problems with his theory are dependent on his definition of
blame; a different interpretation of blame would yield a different kind of
reasonable person test—one that perhaps would not run into the same
problems. And there are other theories of blame on the table. Blame
might not be about whether one appropriately takes into account certain
interests but about whether she engaged in wrongful conduct, or about
her intentions, or the kind of character that she has,159 or perhaps something
else altogether. Depending on which theory we adopt, our interpretation
of the reasonable person test will differ.
To see how this works in practice, let us take a step back from Westen’s
particular theory of blame and look to see what other ways academic
commentators have analyzed the reasonable person. A survey of the
literature demonstrates that Westen was not alone in adopting the control
principle—it is extraordinarily common.160 There is a continuous struggle

159. For one example, see George P. Fletcher, The Individualization of Excusing
Conditions, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1269, 1288–92 (1974). Fletcher argues quite forcefully
that the “only one sound way to determine the traits attributed to the reasonable man . . .
is with an eye to the justice of blaming the accused for having displayed weakness of
character.” Id. at 1292.
160. E.g., MORAN, supra note 4, at 26 (arguing that there is a “tight relationship”
between blameworthiness and legal fault when “the reasonable person is sufficiently
infused with the characteristics of the litigant”); Armour, supra note 24, at 801 (“Insofar
as a defendant can claim that ‘I couldn’t help myself,’ she cannot be blamed for her
reactions, regardless of the subject of her disorder.”); Fletcher, supra note 159, at 1291 &
n.70 (discussing the control principle directly); Horder, supra note 157, at 266–67 (“[I]f
liability is to be fault-based, why blame those who cannot help their mental deficiency
when we do not blame those who cannot help their physical deficiency?”); Lee, supra
note 43, at 381 & n.34, 385 (“[A] subjectivist might argue that one deserves to be
punished [for attempted murder] to the same extent as if one killed the other person
because all that matters are acts that one can control.” (citing Larry Alexander, Crime
and Culpability, 5 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 30 (1994); Arenella, supra note 37, at
831 n.21)). But see Robinson, supra note 7, at 306 (asserting that taking into account all
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to try to draw the line between factors that are under a person’s control
and those that are not. Take as an example Mayo Moran’s argument that
the common law is inconsistent in the way it treats the physically and the
mentally challenged.161 As Jeremy Horder succinctly summarizes, “If I
am blind, I cannot be judged, qua defendant, as if I were a sighted person;
and my needs, qua plaintiff, cannot be ignored by those responsible, for
example, for leaving obstacles on the sidewalk.”162 But in contrast, “if it
is mental disability that explains some shortcoming on my part, the common
law studiously ignores the disability in determining liability questions.”163
Moran’s critique is centered firmly on the control principle: she argues
that “[t]he treatment of mental disabilities is controversial precisely because
of the disconnect that occurs between legal fault and moral blame.”164 She
criticizes the law for “imposing the rigid standard on only one group of
‘incapable’ individuals.”165 Phrased differently, “someone whose mental
abnormality prevents them from recognizing and hence avoiding the harm
in question cannot be morally blameworthy.”166 The intuition is that there is
no defensible way to fill out the phrase “under one’s control” that excludes
physical disabilities but includes mental ones. The law’s implicit attempt
to do this fails, and so we ought to reject or modify it in some way.167
This kind of argument gets repeated throughout the literature, with
different commentators discussing different examples of cases where the
law inconsistently applies the control principle. And so Horder discusses
of the defendant’s characteristics “would turn [the reasonable person test] into a purely
subjective standard, which would fail to make the blameworthiness judgment the law
seeks”).
161. See MORAN, supra note 4, at 18–57.
162. Horder, supra note 157, at 266.
163. Id.
164. MORAN, supra note 4, at 32.
165. Id. at 34 (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 38.
167. See id. at 314. Even when Moran proffers her alternative to the reasonable
person test—suggesting we instead ask whether the defendant was “culpably indifferent”
—she is still open to criticism on grounds of the control principle. She writes that there
is a difference between “a credible claim by an individual that he did not have the
intellectual capacity to perceive the relevant risk, as opposed to a similarly credible claim
that an individual did not have the moral resources to care about imposing the harm.” Id.
at 26–27. But this only pushes the question back a step: one could rightly point out that
the very fact that she did not have the moral resources to care about imposing risks was
outside of her control in precisely the same way that lack of intellectual capacity is. This
is exactly the same problem Westen faces, discussed above. See supra text accompanying
notes 112–129.
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Moran’s work on the distinction between physical and mental disabilities
and wonders whether we should “mak[e] yet further refinements to the
reasonable-person standard” or instead “replace that standard” with a
different test all together.168 Paul Robinson distinguishes the way the law
treats a defendant’s “certifiably bad temper” from “a genetic predisposition
toward violent reaction when provoked,” though both “seem beyond the
actor’s control.”169 Fletcher questions why the duress defense is not
available as a defense to homicide under the common law, though there
can be an equally strong argument that the defendant’s conduct was out
of his control.170 He also suggests that although ordinary cowardice and
selfishness cannot excuse criminal behavior, having “some discernible
pathology to cause us to believe that . . . [he] could not have done otherwise”
would be relevant.171 Lee wonders why the law makes a distinction
between a person who intends to kill but fails and the one who intends to
kill but succeeds, even though the only one that matters for purposes of
criminal culpability “are acts that one can control.”172 And Armour
argues that there are no factual distinctions that “meaningfully distinguish
the battered woman’s claim from that of the negrophobe for the purpose
of [invoking self-defense].”173 The infamous Bernie Goetz case—where a
man shot four African American teenagers in the subway and claimed selfdefense, relying in part on the fact that he had been mugged previously174—
poses precisely the same problems.175 Indeed, much of the confusion
surrounding the reasonable person test, from arguments about so-called
cultural defenses to run-of-the-mill provocation cases, arises out of this
concern.
What is interesting about these and other commentators who follow
this general line of thinking—the control principle has an important
place in criminal law, yet the law does not consistently apply it—is that
there is little explicit recognition that they are pushing up against the
eons-old free will debate. In what sense are any of my traits “under my

168. Horder, supra note 157, at 266–67.
169. Robinson, supra note 7, at 306.
170. See Fletcher, supra note 159, at 1278–79.
171. Id. at 1291.
172. Lee, supra note 43, at 385–86. Lee does not necessarily buy into the control
principle—she discusses the possibility of “instrumentalist” defenses of criminal law—
but she raises the issue as part of this larger discussion.
173. Armour, supra note 24, at 804.
174. See People v. Goetz, 497 N.E.2d 41, 43–44 (N.Y. 1986).
175. Though the case has been written about ad nauseum, see, for example, Armour,
supra note 24, at 781–85, 805.

686

Reasonable Persons

[VOL. 50: 651, 2013]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

control”? Can I not concoct a causal story that explains everything about
me and thereby excuse myself entirely from moral judgment?176
We are now at a point to reach the conclusion this discussion has been
building toward. We have seen that academic commentators discuss the
reasonable person test in the context of their adoption, whether explicit
or implicit, of the control principle. Under a blame-based view of the
criminal law, they assume that a necessary condition to blame a defendant is
that her conduct was “under her control.” And the way that we fill out the
phrase “under one’s control” will straightforwardly affect the way the
criminal law applies the reasonable person test to a given case. If I
conclude that it is under my control whether my bad temper leads me to
act violently but not under my control whether my mental defect causes
me to engage in the same conduct, then the circumstances that are relevant
to the reasonable person test will exclude my bad temper but include my
mental defect. In other words, the list of factors that are not under one’s
control will be those that are relevant to the reasonable person test. Though
they do not explicitly cast their work in these terms, the commentators
discussed above are grappling with the question of what exactly is under
a person’s control; they cannot resolve the way the reasonable person
test applies without first getting a good grasp of how the control principle
works in practice. And so we see again that the factors relevant to the
reasonable person inquiry will vary based on the underlying theory one
takes to justify a particular area of law.
*

*

*

We now know that if we adopt the control principle and adhere to a
blame-based view of the criminal law, the factors that are relevant to the
reasonable person test are dependent on how we fill out the phrase “under
one’s control.” But briefly I would like to open up another possibility that
is much discussed in the philosophical literature but rarely if ever
referenced in the legal community with respect to the reasonable person
test. We might hold fast to a blame-based view of the criminal law while

176. These issues involving the control principle are mediated through the criminal
law, and there may be sound ways to distinguish the function of the criminal law from
the social practice of blaming. Armour notes that there are “instrumentalist” theories of
law, which focus on the way a legal rule furthers the broader interests of society, rather
than a noninstrumentalist theory, which focuses on individual culpability. See id. at
814–15.
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simultaneously rejecting the notion that one can be responsible only for
that which is under her control.
Though rejection of the control principle is counterintuitive, it may be
the best response—perhaps out of a collection of pretty abysmal
responses—to the problem of free will. Rather than detouring into a
quixotic attempt to say anything novel about the free will debate, this
Article will cover one theory that takes this route to fill out the proposition.
There are a host of ways to respond to the problem of free will, broken
down roughly into the incompatibilists, who believe that if the universe
is deterministic, moral responsibility is impossible,177 and the compatibilists,
who believe that even if the universe is deterministic, moral responsibility
is still possible. Compatibilism breaks down further into a series of
competing subtheories about just how it is that determinism and moral
responsibility coexist. To pick one I am sympathetic to, Harry Frankfurt
rejects the control principle out of hand178 and suggests that moral
responsibility can be grounded in the fact that human beings have
“second-order desires”—desires about the desires that they have—and
that “the capacity for reflective self-evaluation . . . is manifested in the
formation of [those] second-order desires.”179 He conceives of an agent’s
will as those desires by which he is motivated in some action or “by which
he will or would be motivated when or if he acts.”180 One’s will, in other
words, are just those desires that are causally efficacious. Freedom of the
will, then, is the ability to choose what constitutes your will; “the statement
that a person enjoys freedom of the will means . . . that he is free to want
what he wants to want. More precisely, it means that he is free to will what
he wants to will, or to have the will he wants.”181 Although it is
theoretically possible for a person to formulate desires of higher and
higher orders, for example, I want that I want that I want . . . that X, “[w]hen
a person identifies himself decisively with one of his first-order desires,

177. Libertarian incompatibilists, who believe that the universe is not deterministic
and that moral responsibility is possible, adhere to the incredible view that “[w]henever a
person performs a free action . . . it’s a miracle. . . . A free agent has, therefore, ‘a prerogative
which some would attribute only to God: each of us, when we act, is a prime mover
unmoved.’” Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person, 68 J.
PHIL. 5, 18 (1971) (quoting Roderick M. Chisholm, Freedom and Action, in FREEDOM
AND DETERMINISM 11, 23 (Keith Lehrer ed., 1966)).
178. For Frankfurt’s explicit argument that the control principle itself should be
rejected, see Harry G. Frankfurt, Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, 66 J.
PHIL. 829, 829–30 (1969).
179. Frankfurt, supra note 177, at 6–7.
180. Id. at 8.
181. Id. at 15.
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this commitment ‘resounds’ throughout the potentially endless array of
higher orders” and can serve as the basis for moral responsibility.182
On Frankfurt’s view, the reasonable person test would be applied quite
differently than Moran, Horder, Armour, and others have suggested.
Rather than asking whether a particular factor is under the defendant’s
control, Frankfurt would ask whether the person’s second-order desires
lined up with her first-order ones. Thus, the addict who wants to be an
addict would be treated differently from the addict who wishes that she
were not an addict, though we would say in both cases that the decision
to take drugs was not under her control.183 I hesitate to delve any deeper
in discussing how the reasonable person test works under Frankfurt’s
theory in particular; the only takeaway point is that there are alternatives
to retributivist theories that do not rely on the control principle, and they
should be seriously considered.
B. Tort Law
This Article has given some insight into the ways that the reasonable
person test is applied in the context of the criminal law. The list of factors
that are relevant will depend on what justification underlies the criminal
justice system—utilitarians will have a different set of factors than
retributivists, and there will be greater variation still about the way that
we fill out each of those theories. Turning now to tort law, this Article will
approach the topic in a similar way, considering two competing theories:
corrective justice and law and economics. In the above discussion of the
criminal law, I gave several examples of how the reasonable person test is
used, including in the definitions of recklessness and negligence and the
elements of a self-defense claim. Rather than cataloguing the various ways
the test pops up in tort law, I note only the most obvious: negligence actions
lie where a defendant proximately harms another by failing to act as a
reasonably prudent person would under the circumstances.184

182. See id. at 16.
183. See id.
184. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL
HARM § 3 cmt. a, § 6 cmt. b (2010).
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1. Accident Costs
Because much of what I say here will dovetail with my discussion of
utilitarianism in Part IV.A.1, my treatment of the economics approach to
tort law will be short, focusing on the differences between the two
subjects.185 Economic theorists adhere to the principle that the best way
to understand a particular area of law is to view it through the lens of a
particular methodology: utility maximization.186 In tort law, economists
usually equate utility maximization with the efficient reduction of the costs
of accidents.187 It is a nonobvious proposition that utility maximization
means, in the realm of tort law, the efficient reduction of accident costs,188
but that is the way that most practicing economists approach the subject.189
Calabresi “take[s] it as given that the principal functions of ‘accident
law’ [that is, tort law] are to compensate victims and reduce accident
costs.”190 Steven Shavell’s work Economic Analysis of Accident Law191
similarly assumes that tort law is about accident costs rather than utility
broadly construed.
There is a lot more to fill in to have a solid understanding of how an
economist would approach a particular case in tort law. As an empirical
matter, it is very difficult to determine what tort rules would lead to the
most efficient reduction of accident costs. We would have to trace out all of
the causal connections that the implementation of a given set of rules
would have on those costs and then compare the total costs produced by
that set of rules to the costs produced by every other set we might
conceivably adopt. Economists have spilled a great deal of ink trying to
figure out what the optimal rules are192 and that the only takeaway point
is that, as we saw in the context of utilitarian approaches to criminal law,
I doubt we will ever be able to approach a definite answer.

185. Utilitarianism and the economics movement within torts are closely related:
“The scholarly tradition from which the positive economic theory of tort law emerged
begins with Jeremy Bentham . . . .” WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 4 (1987).
186. Don Herzog, Externalities and Other Parasites, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 895, 895
(2000).
187. E.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS 26 (1970); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 185, at 1.
188. For an in-depth discussion on this issue, see Hershovitz, supra note 94, at 75;
see also Jackson, supra note 128, at 84 & n.119 (discussing utility maximization).
189. See sources cited supra note 187.
190. Guido Calabresi, The Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation
of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 713 (1965).
191. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 3 (1987).
192. See, e.g., 1 TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS (Michael Faure ed., 2d ed. 2009).
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Putting to one side the empirical issues, economists have tough questions
to answer with respect to their theory as well. First, they have to determine
which costs fall under the term accident costs, and the content of that list
is far from self-evident. Although things like hospital bills and lost wages
are easily included, it is not so clear when we talk about psychological
injury or personal inconvenience or that a certain state of affairs is unfair.
The term costs can cover any causal effect flowing from an accident, and
the decision of whether to call them costs is a normative one with which
economists rarely grapple.193 Second, the term efficiency could be defined
in a number of ways. It could simply mean the lowest total of costs, but
it also might refer to Pareto efficiency, where an allocation is optimal if
at least one person is made better off without making any other person
worse off.194 Or it could mean Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, where a change
in distribution is optimal if the person who gains an advantage has enough
to compensate those who were made worse off, even if she never does.195
There is nothing inherent in the economics approach that would prefer
one interpretation over the other, so again economists have to grapple with
questions of value that will not be answered by appeals to economic models.
Finally, the economist will also have to contend with the possibility
that the most efficient set of rules in tort law is radically different than
what tort law looks like today. For example, there is little reason to think
that the reasonable person test is the single most efficient way of assessing
civil liability. Perhaps some kind of social insurance scheme would be a
cheaper way to reduce the costs of accidents. If that is the case, the
economics approach might have to abolish the reasonable person test
altogether.196 Similarly, even if the economist does incorporate the
reasonable person test into her version of tort law, the circumstances
193. For a discussion about certain costs that law-and-economists have tended to
overlook, see Hershovitz, supra note 94. For the same reason, it is not obvious what
kind of scenarios the term accidents covers.
Note that in Part IV.A.1, I largely assumed away these questions. I chose preference
utilitarianism as the starting point. That theory holds that preferences are the only things
we are concerned with maximizing, and maximize just means satisfying the greatest
number of those preferences.
194. NICHOLAS BARR, THE ECONOMICS OF THE WELFARE STATE 43–45 (5th ed. 2012).
195. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 185, at 16.
196. There is no way to automatically discount this possibility in any field of law
and in any theory of a given field. A blame-based view of criminal law might likewise
preclude the use of the reasonable person test in assessing liability for negligent or reckless
conduct. The only difference is that in the utilitarian or law and economics context, that
outcome would be governed by empirical, rather than theoretical or normative, considerations.
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that are relevant might still be radically different than any common sense
view of what the test involves. It might turn out that it is inefficient to
include the brute physical facts of the circumstances, such as the speed
of the car that hit a pedestrian, in assessing whether the defendant was
negligent, even though these kinds of facts are relevant under any intuitive
reading of the reasonable person test.
Having set out the basics of the economics approach to tort law, we
can apply these principles to the reasonable person test. A circumstance
would be relevant to the test if its inclusion would lead to the most efficient
reduction of accident costs, and it would be irrelevant if its inclusion
would not lead to the most efficient reduction of those costs. So,
for example, if tort law defines accident costs as “economic costs,”197 and
efficiency as “maximization,” then we would want to include those factors
that most reduce the economic costs associated with accidents, paying
no attention to the way in which those costs are distributed. We would
make arguments like ‘The inclusion of the fact that the defendant was a
child would make it harder for a victim to recover from a child in a
negligence action. This in turn would incentivize people to take greater
care to avoid accidents when they are around children, which would
reduce the costs of such accidents.’ In reality this argument would be far
too simple: there is no empirical proof that the incentive would have any
causal effect; there is no indication as to what kind of or how much cost
this incentive would reduce if it did have that causal effect; there is no
consideration of any unintended consequences that might result from
this rule; and so on.
As we saw with utilitarian approaches to criminal law, the questions
involved are straightforward in theory but difficult to apply in practice.
Given the stunning complexity involved in tracking down each and every
effect a given set of rules has on accident costs, I am skeptical that we
can say much more than this: there must be a causal connection between
the inclusion of a particular factor in the reasonable person test and the
amount or distribution of accident costs.198

197. Admittedly, the term economic costs is awfully vague; I mean to suggest the
inclusion of hospital bills, lost wages, damage to property, and the other sorts of things
we traditionally think can be transferred through markets. To the extent someone might
argue this is not a coherent way to distinguish relevant costs from irrelevant ones, I plead
guilty and point out that this is precisely the trouble law and economics theorists are
going to have when they try to create a model for tort law.
198. The logical relationship I have in mind is that for a given factor to be relevant
to the test, it must be a necessary condition to some set of sufficient conditions to affect
the distribution or amount of accident costs—satisfaction of the so-called “NESS test.”
See, e.g., Richard W. Wright, The NESS Account of Natural Causation: A Response to
Criticisms, in PERSPECTIVES ON CAUSATION 285, 285–86 (Richard Goldberg ed., 2011).
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This discussion gives some idea of the way an economist would approach
the question of what circumstances are relevant to the reasonable person
test. As this Article shall explore, the corrective justice approach to tort
law will apply the reasonable person test in a significantly different manner.
2. Corrective Justice
The dominant competing theory to the economist interpretation of tort
law is corrective justice. The term corrective justice is an umbrella term
that covers a number of divergent theories. Stephen Perry has laid out a
taxonomy that categorizes the various possibilities.199 For purposes of
this discussion, I will, without argument, adopt one particular interpretation
of corrective justice.
Elsewhere I have discussed what I called an “obligations-based view”
of tort law,200 which holds that the kind of conduct that gives rise to a
duty to repair is that which we are morally obligated not to do. In other
words, “when we are deciding what kinds of actions constitute tortious
conduct . . . we should look to normative ethics.”201 In the same way that, at
least according to the theory discussed in Part IV.A.2, criminal law bears
a strong connection to moral culpability, tort law bears a strong relationship
to conduct-governing rules. In Perry’s parlance, this theory falls under
the second type of corrective justice—that which holds that the duty to
repair is not a social obligation but one that “involv[es] a limited moral
relationship that holds only between injurer and victim.”202 In some
situations, the fact that A caused B injury gives rise to an obligation in A
to compensate B. And the phrase “in some situations” is filled out by the
content of our duties under the moral law. At the same time, it is
ambivalent between Perry’s fault-based local redistributive theory, where
it is the fact that A acted wrongfully that grounds his obligation to
compensate B,203 and his fault-based volitionist theory, where it is A’s
engaging in voluntary wrongful action that gives rise to his obligation to
compensate B.204 The obligations-based view finds convincing the
199. Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449,
449 (1992). Perry himself adopts a hybrid view where the localized distributive argument and
the strict liability volitionist theory “are complementary.” Id. at 497.
200. Jackson, supra note 128, at 72.
201. Id.
202. Perry, supra note 199, at 449.
203. See id. at 467–68.
204. See id. at 474–75.
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arguments that draw a distinction between evaluating an action and
evaluating a person,205 or what the literature sometimes describes as the
distinction between normative and ascriptive rules, where the question of
“what I may do or ought not to do” is distinct from whether I am morally
blameworthy.206
We are now in a position to see what the obligations-based view has to
say about the factors relevant to the reasonable person inquiry. The
reasonable person test is used in negligence cases to determine whether
or not the alleged tortfeasor has violated a duty owed to the plaintiff.
The obligations-based theory holds that a person’s duties under tort law
are just those things that she has a moral obligation to do or not to do.207
Thus, the factors that are relevant in the reasonable person test are those
factors that, if included, would have the test track our moral obligations.208
But to figure out which factors those are, we have to dig deeper and get a
handle on what an actor’s moral obligations are.209 There is obviously

205. See id.
206. Horder, supra note 157, at 265. Fletcher notes that one’s capacity for selfcontrol, sanity, level of intoxication, and motive for action are all irrelevant in determining
liability for intentional torts. See George P. Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal Negligence:
A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 401, 408 (1971). This tracks well with the
view that tort law—perhaps even in the intentional tort context—involves normative
rather than ascriptive rules. See McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384, 397 (Austl.)
(holding that children are judged by a more “subjective” test because tort is about propriety,
not blameworthiness).
Moran seems to think that, at least in the context of tort law, this distinction does not
hold much weight. In critiquing what she calls the “compensation rationale” for tort, Moran
recognizes that many tort scholars ground their theory in the idea that tort “is understood
primarily as a compensation scheme and fault is seen as an appraisal of acts, not actors.”
MORAN, supra note 4, at 34 (emphasis added). But she rejects this idea, asking, “[W]hat
exactly is the content of this non-culpable fault?” Id. at 36. She contends that there is no
satisfactory answer to this question and that any conception of fault in tort law must rely
in some sense on culpability. See id. at 36–39. There is quite a bit going on in this discussion,
but for now it is enough to say that (1) many corrective justice theorists would dispute
that fault must always be about culpability, and (2) Moran is, like so many other tort theorists
before her, implicitly relying on the control principle. See id.
207. See Jackson, supra note 128, at 72.
208. Of course, tort law does not recognize a duty to perform all of our moral
obligations. There is no duty in tort to lie, absent other conditions, or to be faithful to
one’s partner, or to develop one’s skills, though these are clearly moral obligations we
have. The obligations-based view is analogous to a blame-based view of criminal law,
where there is a strong correlation between what we are to blame for and what we are
criminally liable for, though not a perfect one.
209. Or we, at least, need to get a handle on which moral obligations we have that
tort law will recognize. See supra note 208. It is an open question which obligations the
tort law will recognize, but because that issue revolves around questions of political
theory, it is beyond the scope of this Article.
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much disagreement about that question, depending as it does on one’s
underlying commitments in both normative and applied ethics.
One particularly interesting application of the obligations-based view
comes from its treatment of defenses such as insanity. Under common
law, neither infancy nor insanity is a defense to an intentional tort.210
And courts have usually held that the same rule applies in the context of
negligent actions.211 Whether claims of insanity would factor into the
reasonable person test would depend on the way we characterized insanitybased defenses. If the idea is that an insane person, in committing an act
we ordinarily would consider wrongful, did in fact do something wrong
but is not to blame for it, a “culpability-exculpating excuse,” then it would
have no place in tort law. The obligations-based view holds that tort
instantiates a system of compensation based on wrongful acts, irrespective
of whether the person who committed the act is to blame for what she
did. If, on the other hand, the idea is that the insane person’s allegedly
wrongful conduct was not in fact wrongful—if, because she was insane,
she breached no moral obligation, a “duty-exculpating excuse,”212 then
insanity would be relevant in assessing whether a tort action lies. To
determine whether insanity is a culpability-exculpating or a duty-exculpating
excuse, one would have to determine whether the defendant, as a result of
her insanity, is not properly a person subject to the strictures of the moral
law.213
The argument with respect to age would be similar: age could be
conceived as either culpability-exculpating or duty-exculpating, though
my hunch is that it is the latter. Children, or at least very young children, do
not have the same sorts of obligations to take reasonable care that adults
do.214 The broader point is that the way society determines which
circumstances are relevant to the reasonable person test is dependent on

210. E.g., McGuire v. Almy, 8 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Mass. 1937); Patrick Kelley,
Infancy, Insanity, and the Law of Torts, 48 AM. J. JURIS. 179, 181 & n.6 (2003).
211. E.g., Note, Tort Liability of the Mentally Ill in Negligence Actions, 93 YALE
L.J. 153, 153 & n.1 (1983).
212. There is a high but not perfect correlation between what this Article calls a
“duty-exculpating excuse” and a justification.
213. An excuse could also be both duty-exculpating and culpability-exculpating. If
I think that very young children do not have moral obligations, I certainly do not think
they are to blame for failing to follow an obligation that does not bind them.
214. See P. F. Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 187 (1962),
reprinted in P. F. STRAWSON, FREEDOM AND RESENTMENT AND OTHER ESSAYS 1, 8–11,
19 (1974).
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our underlying commitments—this time in the realm of ethics. Just as
the blame-based view of criminal law devolved into a series of competing
subviews that debate the control principle’s connection to moral
responsibility, under the umbrella of an obligations-based view of corrective
justice, there is plenty of room for disagreement in the particulars. Without
addressing our disagreements on that level, there is little hope we will
ever arrive at a satisfactory answer about the reasonable person test.
*

*

*

This Article discusses an obligations-based theory of tort not just because
I find it persuasive but also because it is easier to see the way in which
the theory drives the determination of which circumstances are relevant
to the reasonable person test. The connection relates to one’s commitments
in normative and applied ethics. But for other theories of corrective justice,
the connection is not so clear-cut. There are two ways that the connection
between the reasonable person’s circumstances and the underlying
corrective justice theory come apart: when the theory suggests we
should scrap the test altogether and when the theory is, in a relevant sense,
incomplete. To see how the first works in practice, let us turn to a model
Richard Epstein has propounded215—what Perry calls the “restitution”
theory—which says that “A has come into possession of something that
belongs to B and hence must give it back.”216 Epstein suggests that “torts
themselves are a sub-class of takings.”217 By engaging in a tortious act
and causing injury, the tortfeasor has taken something from the victim—
something the victim has a property right in—and it is this fact that gives
rise to A’s obligation to compensate B. By now it is obvious that the
reasonable person test does not so easily map on to the restitution theory’s
sense of the duty prong of a common law negligence claim. If Epstein is
right that tort is about compensating for the wrongful interference of a
property right, then it is not clear why we need a reasonable person to
tell us when the tortfeasor has violated his duty. The question is not how
a reasonable person would act given the circumstances but rather whether B
had a property right that A interfered with. We could try to twist and distort
the reasonable person test in a way to better capture Epstein’s theory—
so that the circumstances relevant to the reasonable person test are those
that, if included, would capture cases where B’s property right has been
infringed—but simply by formulating the test this way, it is clear that it is

215. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 35–37 (1985).
216. Perry, supra note 199, at 451.
217. EPSTEIN, supra note 215, at 79 (1985).
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a bad fit.218 Better to abolish the reasonable person test altogether and
replace it with something else—possibly by defining breach in negligence
actions as “violations of another’s property right.”
At first blush, this seems to be in direct contradiction to this Article’s
larger thesis. The underlying theory of tort law is supposed to provide an
answer about which circumstances are relevant to the reasonable person
test. But if one adopts Epstein’s theory, then not only does this tell us
very little about what circumstances would be relevant, it suggests that
we ought to get rid of the test altogether, at least in the realm of tort law.
But this is not quite right. It is true that the underlying theory provides the
circumstances relevant to the test. But depending on the field of law and
its underlying theory, there may come a point where the reasonable person,
malleable as she is, will be unable to capture what the law is supposed to
be doing. The law does not employ the reasonable person test to determine
whether a person committed premeditated murder or whether a state has
violated the Equal Protection Clause. That is because the point of having a
premeditated murder statute and an Equal Protection Clause is not captured
by a reasonable person test. In those cases, the reasonable person has no
business occupying that legal subject. Moran’s Rethinking the Reasonable
Person makes this claim when it suggests replacing the reasonable person
test with a “culpable indifference” test for both criminal and civil
negligence.219 The only difference is that by examining the underlying
theory, we can better articulate why we think the test should be cordoned
off.
The second reason for the weak connection between some corrective
justice theories and the circumstances of the reasonable person test is the
theory’s incompleteness. Consider what Perry calls the fault-based
volitionist view, which holds that it is A’s voluntarily engaging in a
wrongful act that gives rise to an obligation to compensate B.220 We cannot
easily determine what circumstances are relevant to the reasonable person
test, though at least we have an inkling that their inclusion should capture
voluntary and wrongful conduct. But this is because the theory does not,
yet, explain what wrongful and voluntary mean. Once the fault-based
volitionist articulates a workable definition of those terms, we can determine

218. This is one reason to think that Epstein’s account of tort law is revisionist and,
in my opinion, not particularly persuasive.
219. See MORAN, supra note 4, at 274.
220. See Perry, supra note 199, at 474–75.
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which circumstances would be relevant to the test.221 This can be
generalized to other theories of corrective justice, including Jules Coleman’s
annulment thesis and the localized distributive justice theory. These
theories will not necessarily help in filling out the features of the reasonable
person. But this flows from the fact that most corrective justice theories
are concerned with the mechanism by which rights and obligations arise
in tort law. They are trying to explain how in some situations A’s causal
contribution to B’s loss gives rise to a duty in A to compensate B and a
corresponding right of recovery in B from A. The explanation for that
mechanism will not usually say much about how to fill in the concepts
of fault and duty in tort law.222
C. Miranda
This Article has covered in general terms the way the reasonable person
test functions in both criminal and tort law. My treatment of these
subjects was fairly involved. This is due partly to the fact that both criminal
and tort law have a long and storied history with the reasonable person
test, but it is also because tort and criminal law are also closely connected to
each other. They both speak in terms of fault and wrongdoing and, at least
on some theories, have a strong connection to moral theory. They are
similar enough that Mayo Moran treats negligence in criminal law and
tort law roughly the same, advocating that we abolish the reasonable person
test in both fields and replace it with a culpable indifference test that, she
argues, works equally well in both fields.223 But the reasonable person is
not just used to evaluate whether a defendant was at fault. She also peeks
her head into areas that bear little resemblance to the recklessness,
negligence, and self-defense claims this Article has discussed up to this
point. This final subpart will more succinctly consider one of those areas—
the Supreme Court’s Miranda jurisprudence.
Anyone who studies the Supreme Court’s Miranda decisions will be
struck by the number of times that the reasonable person test comes into
play. A police officer must give Miranda warnings whenever she
interrogates a suspect who is in custody, and a suspect is “in custody” if

221. Or, alternatively, we could decide that the reasonable person test does not
work in tort law, as Epstein would probably argue.
222. See Hershovitz, supra note 94, at 106 (“The corrective justice claim is that tort
is an institution that, in the narrow view, enforces duties of repair, or in the broader view,
works to put matters right between a wrongdoer and her victim. . . . However, corrective
justice theorists do not purport to provide a theory that explains the fine-grained features
of tort doctrine, let alone one that should drive results in particular cases.”).
223. See MORAN, supra note 4, at 274.
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a reasonable person would not feel free to leave.224 An “interrogation”
occurs when there are “any words or actions on the part of the police (other
than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should
know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.”225 The warnings themselves must be given so that a reasonable
person would understand them.226 However, no warning needs to be given
if the questioning was “reasonably prompted by a concern for the public
safety.”227 In determining whether a suspect has asserted her Miranda
rights, the Court asks whether a reasonable officer would consider the
defendant’s behavior or words as such an assertion.228 And after a suspect
has asserted her right to remain silent, the police may resume the
interrogation even if counsel is not present so long as a reasonable officer
would think that the suspect initiated the exchange.229
The Court’s treatment of the reasonable person test in its custodial
interrogation cases has not been a model of clarity. It has, for example,
frequently shifted its perspectives, inquiring at different times about the
reasonable police officer, the reasonable suspect, and the reasonable
member of society.230 Commentators have suggested that the Court’s
decisions reflect a particular type of reasonable defendant—one who
“lacks basic human emotions, understandings, and expectations.”231 This
ends up “mask[ing] the considerations that are actually driving [its]
decisions.”232 Academics have also noted that Miranda jurisprudence
has evolved significantly from the Supreme Court’s initial decision in

224. Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 663 (2004) (quoting Thompson v.
Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995)).
225. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980) (footnote omitted). Although
the Court applies a rather unusual reasonable person test: the definition of interrogation
“focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police.”
Id. As Mandiberg notes, the issue is “not how the suspect would view the officer’s behavior,
but how the reasonable officer should think the suspect would view it.” Mandiberg, supra
note 11, at 1490 n.43.
226. See Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 60 (2010).
227. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 656 (1984).
228. See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259–60 (2010).
229. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 104–05 (1975).
230. See Kinports, supra note 36.
231. Mandiberg, supra note 11, at 1482–83.
232. Id. at 1483. Mandiberg thinks that it is the interests in effective investigative
procedures and in law and order that “usually prevail.” Id.
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1966.233 Thus, a reference to “Miranda rights” might be intended to capture
just the Warren Court’s decision in that case, the body of case law that
has developed since that decision, or the broader rules that govern police
interrogation of suspects today.234
I do not want to get too bogged down in the specifics of the way the
Court has articulated the various reasonable person tests, but instead I
would like to concentrate on how the animating concerns of the Court’s
Miranda jurisprudence influence—or at least, should influence—the way
the Court applies the test to a given case. On that note, this Article will
cabin the discussion and assume that Miranda’s protections are just what
the Court says they are: prophylactic measures to protect against coerced
confessions.235 Miranda rights are “not themselves rights protected by the
Constitution but are instead measures to insure that the right against
compulsory self-incrimination is protected.”236
If the purpose of the Court’s Miranda jurisprudence is to protect
against coerced confessions, then the justification for the Miranda decision
“rests on [a] cost-benefit analysis in which its costs in reducing the
effectiveness of police interrogation are assayed against its benefits in
protecting suspects from abuses.”237 Unfortunately, as Cassell and Hayman
recognize, there is very little data to go on: “In this ‘empirical desert,’
we have little knowledge about what police interrogation looked like
shortly after Miranda, much less what it looks like today. How many
suspects waive their Miranda rights? How many confess? How important
are confessions to the outcome of prosecutions?”238 For purposes of this
Article, however, we can cabin most of the empirical questions. I have
limited my discussion to the question of which factors are relevant to the
reasonable person inquiries that abound in Miranda, and thus, the causal
effects of the inclusion or exclusion of these factors are all that need be
considered. Moreover, because this Article has assumed that the purpose of
Miranda is to guard against coerced confessions, we can limit the
discussion even further: if the inclusion or exclusion of a given factor has

233. See Steven B. Duke, Does Miranda Protect the Innocent or the Guilty?, 10
CHAP. L. REV. 551, 553 (2007) (“Part of what fuels the vast literature about Miranda are
the multitudinous meanings of the subject of the debate.”).
234. Id. at 553–57.
235. See, e.g., J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394, 2401 (2011) (“[T]his
Court in Miranda adopted a set of prophylactic measures designed to safeguard the
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination.”).
236. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S 649, 654 (1984) (quoting Michigan v. Tucker,
417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
237. Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the 1990s: An
Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 841 (1996).
238. Id. at 840 (footnote omitted).
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no effect on the number of coerced confessions, we may discount it entirely.
The question posed can therefore be answered via a three-part inquiry:
First, we must ascertain which circumstances have a causal effect
on coerced confessions. Second, we must determine what additional
causal effects the inclusion or exclusion of each factor within that limited
set has, broadly speaking. And third, we must consider the sum total of
these effects and determine whether, taken together, they counsel in favor of
or against including a particular factor in the reasonable person test.
With respect to the first prong, the question is whether the inclusion of
a given factor would increase or decrease the number of confessions the
police coerce out of suspects.239 We would not consider, as the Court
did in its most recent decision on the subject, whether the exclusion of a
factor “blind[s] [police officers or courts] to [a] commonsense reality”240
or whether a factor “would have affected how a reasonable person” would
view the situation.241 We would instead have to first determine what
constitutes a “coerced” confession. The line between cunning police
practices and unconstitutional coercive pressure is not an easy one to
draw.242 Assuming we arrive at a satisfactory answer, the causal chain
from the inclusion of a factor to its effect on the number of coerced
confessions is complex. When a court is deciding whether a particular
factor is relevant to Miranda, it is trying to determine whether the case
fits into the broader rule ex post. The statement—whether coerced or
not—has already been made to the police, and the question is whether to

239. It is possible that certain factors may causally affect the degree to which a
confession is coerced. Perhaps, for example, the inclusion of the suspect’s mental health
history would not reduce the number of overall coerced confessions but may make some
or all of those confessions less coercive. It is also an open question whether reducing the
amount of coercion is a worthwhile objective.
240. J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. at 2399. This justification for the inclusion of age in the incustody question is a non sequitur: it just has nothing to do with any reason we might
have for including a given factor.
241. Id. at 2402 (quoting Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 325 (1994) (per
curiam)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, no matter how one interprets the
purposes of Miranda, the fact that the inclusion of a factor affects the reasonable person
test will never be a good reason to include that factor.
242. This obviously is no small issue, but for some background on the major
arguments, see Scott A. Anderson, The Enforcement Approach to Coercion, J. ETHICS &
SOC. PHIL., Oct. 2010, http://www.jesp.org/PDF/TheEnforcementApproachFinal.pdf.
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apply the exclusionary rule to it.243 The court, therefore, has to determine
what effect the inclusion of the given factor will have on its—and other
courts’—current and future determinations about whether the statement
is excluded. It will then have to inquire about whether that effect will
reduce the number of coerced statements made in the future. That part of
the causal chain probably, but not necessarily, involves incentivizing the
police, by threatening to exclude inculpatory statements, to take greater care
in interrogating suspects: the assumption is that if the police take greater
care, fewer coerced confessions will result.
Unfortunately, although a great deal has been written about the effect
that Miranda has had on police interrogations generally, there are no
studies I am aware of that seek to answer this more narrowly tailored
question. The best approach is to attempt to extrapolate from the available
data. There is some evidence suggesting Miranda warnings in general
have very little effect: “About four out of five custodial suspects in the
United States who are asked to submit to interrogation do so.”244 But it
is not clear whether there is any correlation between those who invoke their
right to remain silent and those who received Miranda warnings.245
Moreover, it is difficult to determine how Miranda warnings affect
confession rates because the latter are influenced by a wide variety of
factors.246 And there are of course other possible causal chains. Miranda
warnings, for example, may induce a suspect to speak: “Skillfully presented,
the Miranda warnings themselves sound chords of fairness and sympathy
at the outset of the interrogation. The interrogator . . . becomes all the more
persuasive by dint of his apparent candor and reasonableness.”247 The
inquiry is further complicated by the fact that even if the police comply
with Miranda, the defendant may always challenge the admissibility of
her statement on grounds that she was actually coerced.248 The decision to
243. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985). The doctrine further
complicates matters because, as the Elstad Court held, a coerced statement might still be
used for impeachment purposes on cross-examination. Id. at 307.
244. Duke, supra note 233, at 555.
245. Id. at 557 (“Some seem to assume that whoever refuses to submit to interrogation
after being warned of his rights does so because of the warning. But that is the post hoc,
ergo propter hoc fallacy: temporal succession does not establish cause and effect.”).
Indeed, there is evidence that the correlation is much stronger between those who have
been convicted of a felony in the past and those who invoke their Miranda rights. William J.
Stuntz, Miranda’s Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 993 (2001) (citing Richard A. Leo,
Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 286–87 (1996)).
246. For a brief recap of some of these factors, see Duke, supra note 233, at 556.
247. Patrick A. Malone, “You Have the Right To Remain Silent”: Miranda After
Twenty Years, 55 AM. SCHOLAR 367, 371 (1986).
248. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (holding that even if the police
give the proper warnings, the court must still determine whether the waiver was given
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently).
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include a particular factor into the reasonable person test must therefore
eliminate coerced confessions that courts would not otherwise exclude
on grounds that they were in fact coerced.249 Finally, we do not know
whether or to what extent the causal effects of these factors interrelate. It
might be, for example, that factor x has, on its own, no causal effect
whatsoever but that coupled with the introduction of factor y, it does.
The complexity of the causal chain makes me skeptical that Miranda has
much of an effect on the number of coerced confessions.250 In any
case, as this brief discussion demonstrates, the first prong of the inquiry is
extraordinarily difficult and perhaps impossible to definitively answer.
With respect to the second prong, the inquiry becomes even more
complicated. To reach an answer, we must take those factors that do have
an effect on the number of coerced confessions the police extract and
determine what additional effects those factors have, broadly speaking.
We must, in other words, decide what negative side effects courts should
be willing to live with in their quest to reduce coerced statements. If the
goal were solely to reduce coercive interrogation practices, we could
throw out the reasonable person test and declare that the police cannot
talk to anyone. But we reject that out of hand because the costs associated
with that rule are too high: the police have a legitimate interest in
investigating crime, and it would unduly hamper their efforts if they were
not permitted to speak to anyone.251 Thus, we recognize that there are
countervailing considerations at play that must be considered. Answering
this question is thus more complicated than the first prong of the inquiry
for two reasons. First, it requires us to determine as a normative matter
which causal effects are properly considered in assessing whether a factor
should be included in a reasonable person test. There are a great many
effects that a factor might have, but only some of them ought to be taken
into account. A factor’s impact on the ability of the police to ferret out
guilty parties is certainly an important concern; that same factor’s tendency
249. But see Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure To Restrain Pernicious Interrogation
Practices, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1211, 1220 (2001) (suggesting that judges are highly unlikely to
find that a confession was involuntary if the police complied with Miranda’s procedural
protections).
250. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 13–14.
251. Cassell and Fowles suggest that Miranda warnings do increase the number of
suspects to exercise their right to remain silent and that this results in a lower rate of
convicting the guilty. See Paul G. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Cops? A
Thirty Year Perspective on Miranda’s Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1055, 1126–27 (1998).
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to, say, cause police to wear black socks instead of blue ones is probably
not.
Second, rather than cabining our inquiry into one particular causal
effect—in prong one, whether a factor increased or decreased the number of
coerced confessions—we must consider a wide range of causal effects.
Mapping out the various ways in which the inclusion of a given factor
affected the number of coerced confessions was difficult enough, but in
prong two, we must make the same empirical inquires into a host of
different effects. To give only a couple of examples to demonstrate how
unmanageable this project is, consider some rather far-fetched but possible
examples. Perhaps the innocent are better protected by the inclusion of a
given factor because it increases the number of guilty suspects who exercise
their right to remain silent. If the guilty exercised this right less frequently,
they would lie more often and their lies would make the police much
more skeptical of the innocents who truthfully deny their guilt.252 Similarly,
it might be the case that if the police are unable to obtain confessions from
the guilty as the result of the inclusion of a given factor, they may
extract a larger number of false confessions from the innocent.253
Finally, with respect to the third prong, we must make a value judgment
about whether the sum total of causal effects associated with a factor or
set of factors justifies its inclusion. Again, I do not want to fall too far
down the rabbit hole, but there is quite a bit of room for disagreement
about the extent to which providing protection against coerced confessions
outweighs254 the deleterious side effects that might result. I hesitate to
go any further if only because, as the discussion above has shown, we
cannot even know which effects we must weigh without answering the
first two prongs of the inquiry.
All this is to say that the question of which factors are relevant to
Miranda’s various reasonable person tests is not easily answered. Still,
there are certain conclusions to be drawn. The factors relevant to Miranda’s
reasonable person test will be dictated in large part by one’s underlying
normative commitments. Any complete answer will have to provide a
working definition of coercion, determine which causal effects are proper

252. See Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A
Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 433–45
(2000).
253. Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost
Confessions—and from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 498–99 (1998).
254. Though this Article uses the term outweighs, it is not to suggest that a strict
cost-benefit analysis is the only way to make this determination. A hard-line deontologist
could say that coerced confessions are always wrong and must be minimized regardless
of any other effects that might come into play. The term outweighs is capacious enough
to cover these kinds of alternative decisionmaking methods.
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concerns of Miranda, and provide a criterion to weigh those causal effects
against each other. Although there are a number of knotty empirical
questions that must also be answered, we will not get anywhere without
grappling with and providing a satisfactory answer to these value-laden
questions.
V. CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have demonstrated that in the context of the reasonable
person test, the traditional way of distinguishing relevant characteristics
from irrelevant ones—appealing to the distinction between objective and
subjective facts—must be rejected. There is no principled way to sort
these characteristics a priori. Rather, the factors we consider relevant to the
test will vary depending not just on the field of law but also on the
underlying theory that animates that field of law. In discussing the test’s
use in the criminal law, tort law, and Miranda jurisprudence, I have
provided an explanation into the way this theory works in practice,
describing the mechanisms by which underlying theories sort relevant
characteristics from irrelevant ones. I have shown that the various debates
scholars have over the proper way to apply the reasonable person test will
not and cannot be resolved without first examining our underlying
commitments. It is of course theoretically possible that there is significant
consistency across these theories—that, for example, the factors a corrective
justice approach to tort law deems relevant turn out to be precisely the
same ones that a tort economic theorist or a blame-based criminal law
theorist would include—but that would be completely fortuitous and I
imagine, unlikely. This Article has demonstrated that there is no single,
all-encompassing reasonable person test, as scholars commonly assume.
In reality, there are a variety of reasonable person tests, each of which
uses a different set of factors. Which test is used will depend both on the
area of law and also normative judgments that lurk just below the surface of
courts’ and scholars’ discussions on how the reasonable person test applies.
A couple of parting thoughts. This work has been from start to finish
dedicated to the theory of the reasonable person test. But there is more
to understanding the proper application of an area of law to a given case
than examining the underlying theory. Moran’s book is a prime example,
where she takes empirical facts about the way the reasonable person test
is used to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, mental disability, and
age and argues from there that the test itself ought to be abandoned. These
practical or empirical concerns will always be relevant to the debate, and
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I do not mean to suggest they are unimportant. But theory, too, has an
important role to play, and this Article provides a sound methodology to
approach that issue.
Along the same lines, in arguing that there is significant variation in
the way the reasonable person test works, I remain open to the possibility
that there still exists a common core of circumstances that will be relevant
across the board. This feeds back into the point made above that we may
decide that the reasonable person has no business being used in a given
subject.255 There may well come a point where we realize, as a result of
our theoretical commitments, that the reasonable person test just should
not be used in, say, negligence or Miranda jurisprudence. But the fact
that we are able to make this claim presupposes that there are common
attributes among the various iterations of the test. These features might
all be in the test’s form, but some of them might also be certain
circumstances that will always be relevant. My hunch is that this is
exactly what is going on and that the reasonable person’s circumstances
must include the physical facts known to the defendant, for example, the
physical layout of the nearby space and the shape and size of nearby objects,
and the defendant’s mental characteristics associated with perception, for
example, blindness and language ability, but that is a question for
another article. As I mentioned in the introduction, I knew that I would
not be able to develop a complete theory of the reasonable person in one
shot. But I hope that this Article is the necessary first step toward that
larger project—a project that, as I have argued, will also force us to grapple
with our most basic normative commitments.

255.
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